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AGENCY SELF-INSULATION UNDER
PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
Jennifer Nou
Agencies possess enormous regulatory discretion. This discretion allows executive branch
agencies in particular to insulate their decisions from presidential review by raising the
costs of such review. They can do so, for example, through variations in policymaking form,
cost-benefit analysis quality, timing strategies, and institutional coalition-building. This
Article seeks to help shift the literature’s focus on court-centered agency behavior to
consider, instead, the role of the President under current executive orders. Specifically, it
marshals public-choice insights to offer an analytic framework for what it calls agency selfinsulation under presidential review, illustrates the phenomenon, and assesses some
normative implications. The framework generates several empirically testable hypotheses
regarding how presidential transitions and policy shifts will influence agency behavior. It
also challenges the doctrinal focus on removal restrictions, and highlights instead a more
functional understanding of agency independence. Finally, these dynamics suggest a role
for courts to help enforce separation of powers principles within the executive branch, and
along with Congress, to also facilitate political monitoring by encouraging information from
sources external to the presidential review process.

INTRODUCTION
dministrative agencies, like trial judges facing appellate review, dislike having their decisions reversed. Reversals are costly. They can
upend months, usually years, of work spent gathering data, reaching out to
stakeholders, considering and responding to public comments.1 This is to
say nothing of the efforts required to draft regulatory text, analyses, and
preambles with the sustained coordination of policy experts, economists,
scientists, and lawyers through multiple stages of the rulemaking process,
from proposed to final form.2 Even then, reversals will only create more
work if agencies are sent back to the drawing board, in settings where re-

A

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
 Public Law Fellow, University of Chicago Law School; former policy analyst and special assistant to the Administrator of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs. The views expressed are
the author’s own and based only on public documents. For helpful comments on earlier drafts, thanks
to Bruce Ackerman, Ryan Bubb, Richard Epstein, William Eskridge, David Fontana, Tom Ginsburg,
Aziz Huq, Alex Lee, Michael Levin, Jerry Mashaw, Jonathan Masur, Tom Miles, Eric Posner, Richard
Posner, Connor Raso, Susan Rose-Ackerman, Matthew Stephenson, Jed Stiglitz, Cass Sunstein, and
Stuart Shapiro. Thanks also to workshop participants at the University of Chicago, Duke, George
Washington, Harvard, New York University, Northwestern’s Law and Political Economy Colloquium,
University of Pennsylvania, and Yale.
1 See Stuart Shapiro, Presidents and Process A Comparison of the Regulatory Process Under the
Clinton and Bush (43) Administrations, 23 J.L. & POL. 393, 416 (2007) (reporting an average of 813
days between agenda publication and finalization for Bush Administration rules and 844 days for Clinton Administration rules during corresponding time periods).
2 See Elizabeth Magill & Adrian Vermeule, Allocating Power Within Agencies, 120 YALE L.J.
1032, 1036–41 (2011) (describing the complicated dynamics among internal agency actors).
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sources are already constrained and budgets consistently threatened. Reversals also thwart the policy preferences of the agency.
That agencies may act strategically to avoid costly reversals, then, is
hardly a surprise, nor is it a novel insight. For the most part, however,
scholars have explored this premise with respect to the anticipated effects
of judicial review.3 From this outlook, an agency facing the prospect of
litigation will behave so as to minimize the risk of judicial reversals. A rational agency, that is, will select its interpretive or policy choices efficiently, taking into account the court’s expected reaction and perhaps even its
partisan composition.4 For example, many noted that after United States v.
Mead Corp.,5 an agency could now expect to qualify for greater deference
through more elaborate proceedings.6 Some thus expected to see agencies
engage in more notice-and-comment rulemaking relative to less formal
mechanisms after the decision, and have found limited empirical support
for this claim.7 As the potential for costly judicial reversals increased, so
did concerns about regulatory “ossification.”8
What this perspective overlooks, however, is the fact that the vast majority of rulemaking agencies — the executive branch agencies — face not
only the courts’ review of their decisions, but also that of the President.
The lopsided attention in the literature to judicial review is thus puzzling
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
3 See, e.g., Yehonatan Givati, Strategic Statutory Interpretation by Administrative Agencies, 12 AM.
L. & ECON. REV. 95 (2010); M. Elizabeth Magill, Agency Choice of Policymaking Form, 71 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1383, 1437–42 (2004); Jud Mathews, Deference Lotteries, 91 TEX. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013);
Matthew C. Stephenson, The Strategic Substitution Effect Textual Plausibility, Procedural Formality,
and Judicial Review of Agency Statutory Interpretations, 120 HARV. L. REV. 528 (2006); Emerson H.
Tiller, Controlling Policy by Controlling Process Judicial Influence on Regulatory Decision Making,
14 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 114 (1998); Emerson H. Tiller & Pablo T. Spiller, Strategic Instruments Legal
Structure and Political Games in Administrative Law, 15 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 349 (1999); Ralph K.
Winter, Jr., Judicial Review of Agency Decisions The Labor Board and the Court, 1968 SUP. CT. REV.
53, 74–75 (1968); see also sources cited infra note 4.
4 These accounts generally predict that agency behavior, and litigation incentives more generally,
will shift under “hard look” review in ways that are sensitive to reviewing judges’ nominating parties.
See, e.g., Brandice Canes-Wrone, Bureaucratic Decisions and the Composition of the Lower Courts, 47
AM. J. POL. SCI. 205, 210 (2003); Frank B. Cross & Emerson H. Tiller, Judicial Partisanship and Obedience to Legal Doctrine Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE L.J. 2155, 2175
(1998); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U. CHI. L.
REV. 761, 813–14 (2008); Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REV. 1717, 1735 (1997).
5 533 U.S. 218 (2001).
6 See, e.g., Stephenson, supra note 3, at 532; see also Mead, 533 U.S. at 226–27 (holding that
“administrative implementation of a particular statutory provision qualifies for Chevron deference when
it appears that Congress delegated authority to the agency generally to make rules carrying the force of
law, and that the agency interpretation claiming deference was promulgated in the exercise of that authority,” which “may be shown in a variety of ways, as by an agency’s power to engage in adjudication
or notice-and-comment rulemaking”).
7 See, e.g., Anne Joseph O’Connell, Political Cycles of Rulemaking An Empirical Portrait of the
Modern Administrative State, 94 VA. L. REV. 889, 932–33 (2008).
8 See, e.g., JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE 164–65 (1997); Thomas O.
McGarity, Some Thoughts on “Deossifying” the Rulemaking Process, 41 DUKE L.J. 1385, 1419 (1992).
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for multiple reasons. First, presidential review is more systematic than judicial review. Judicial review of an agency action is only available when a
litigating party with standing and the necessary resources brings suit.9 Not
only must that party demonstrate that she has come to court at the right
time (that is, when the issue is ripe, based on a final agency action, and
administratively exhausted),10 but also that review is not precluded by
statute, nor committed to the agency’s discretion.11 Presidential review of
rulemaking, by contrast, encompasses all “significant” regulatory actions
submitted for review directly by the agencies themselves.12
Even when a party does bring suit, courts are often self-consciously
deferential to an agency’s interpretive and policy decisions.13 Presidential
review, however, operates under weaker principles of self-restraint. Presidential review is also broader in coverage than judicial review. More rules
are reviewed by the executive branch relative to the courts — and the legislature, for that matter.14 How many and which rules count as “significant” enough for presidential review varies, but in recent years, the number
has hovered between about 500 and 700 per year.15 Only a small fraction
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
9 See 5 U.S.C. § 702 (2006) (“A person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or adversely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a relevant statute, is entitled to
judicial review thereof.”); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (holding that parties failed to demonstrate circumscribed standing requirements). Regarding litigation resources, see
Wendy Wagner, Revisiting the Impact of Judicial Review on Agency Rulemakings An Empirical Investigation, 53 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1717, 1746–47 (2012).
10 See 5 U.S.C. § 704 (2006); e.g., Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140–41 (1967); Myers v.
Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S. 41, 50–51 (1938); Reliable Automatic Sprinkler Co. v. CPSC,
324 F.3d 726, 731 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
11 See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006); Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 830 (1985).
12 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1994).
13 See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (“The responsibilities for assessing the wisdom of such policy choices and resolving the struggle between competing views of the public interest are not judicial ones . . . .”); Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n of the U.S.,
Inc. v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (despite hard look, emphasizing that
“scope of review under the ‘arbitrary and capricious’ standard is narrow and a court is not to substitute
its judgment for that of the agency.”).
14 Congress, after passing a statute delegating discretion to an administrative agency can, of course,
always override an agency rule by amending the statute. But taking the statute as a given, Congress’s
main opportunity to review an agency’s rule currently arises under the 1996 Congressional Review Act.
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 801–808 (2006). That Act, among other things, requires agencies to send a copy of
every new final rule and its associated analysis to Congress and the Government Accountability Office.
Id. at § 801(a)(1)(A) & (B). Within a sixty-day review period, Congress can use expedited procedures
to pass a joint resolution of disapproval overturning the rule. Id. at § 801(a)(3)(B). To date, however,
the statute has been used only once in over a decade to invalidate a rule. That rule was the Occupational Safety and Health Administration’s ergonomics standard in March 2001, “an action that some believe
to be unique to the circumstances of its passage.” MORTON ROSENBERG, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.,
RL 30116, CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW OF AGENCY RULEMAKING: AN UPDATE AND ASSESSMENT
OF THE CONGRESSIONAL REVIEW ACT AFTER A DECADE, CONG. RESEARCH SERVICE REPORT
FOR CONGRESS 6 (2008).
15 See CURTIS W. COPELAND, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL32397, FEDERAL RULEMAKING: THE
ROLE OF THE OFFICE OF INFORMATION AND REGULATORY AFFAIRS 2 (2009); U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND
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of these, however, is litigated and reviewed in court.16 Even if one argues
that the threat of judicial review alone is sufficient to shift agency behavior, the prospect is still more attenuated relative to presidential review.
Finally, presidential review precedes even the possibility of judicial
oversight for many executive branch regulatory actions. Such review will
cover agency actions much earlier in the rulemaking process, not only proposed and final rules as is commonly mischaracterized in the literature,17
but also more preliminary notices of inquiry, requests for information, and
advance notices of proposed rulemaking.18 Doctrines such as ripeness and
finality, however, preclude judicial review of such actions.19 The failure to
decompose the effects of this sequential review process — presidential,
then judicial — may cloud existing empirical efforts to consider the impacts of court oversight.
The relative lack of attention to agency incentives when faced with
presidential review, in short, has resulted in an ultimately incomplete account of agency behavior. Extant work has focused on discrete but related
issues such as the institutional role of cost-benefit analysis,20 the effects of
political transitions more broadly,21 and agency attempts to avoid the review process altogether.22 Positive political theorists have long considered
the strategic interactions between political actors and the bureaucracy, but
their models of political control are often more Congress-centric, frequent–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
TRANSPARENCY
OF
THOSE
REVIEWS
3–4
(2003),
available
at
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d03929.pdf.
16 For example, from 1988–90, only thirteen of the twenty-eight significant hazardous waste rules
from the Environmental Protection Agency were challenged and reviewed in court. See Cary
Coglianese, Litigating within Relationships Disputes and Disturbance in the Regulatory Process, 30 L.
& SOC’Y REV. 735, 742 (1996). Of the agency’s more than ninety hazardous air pollutant rules, only
seven have been litigated to judgment, leaving eighty-three to escape judicial attention. See Wagner,
supra note 9, at 1740.
17 See, e.g., Michael Hissam, Essay, The Impact of Executive Order 13,422 on Presidential Oversight of Agency Administration, 76 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1292, 1295 (2008) (describing Clinton’s executive order as requiring “cabinet departments and agencies to submit proposed and final rules to the
OMB before publication in the Federal Register” (emphasis added)).
18 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994).
19 See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Comm’r, FDA, 740 F.2d 21, 33–34 (D.C. Cir. 1984)
(holding that ripeness and finality doctrines precluded review of FDA advance notice of proposed rulemaking regulation because, among other things, the proposal had yet “to pass under the censorial eye of
OMB, whose review might well have prompted revision”).
20 See, e.g., Jason Scott Johnston, A Game Theoretic Analysis of Alternative Institutions for Regulatory Cost-Benefit Analysis, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1343, 1367–70 (2002) (discussing how administrative
process with cost-benefit information serves as “information revelation device”); Eric A. Posner, Controlling Agencies with Cost-Benefit Analysis A Positive Political Theory Perspective, 68 U. CHI. L.
REV. 1137 (2001); see also Michael A. Livermore, Cost-Benefit Analysis and Agency Independence 7–9
(unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (arguing that agencies can use cost-benefit analysis
methodology as means of resisting presidential review).
21 See Anne Joseph O’Connell, Agency Rulemaking and Political Transitions, 105 NW. U. L. REV.
471, 477–78 (2011); O’Connell, supra note 7.
22 See Note, OIRA Avoidance, 124 HARV. L. REV. 994 (2011).
THE
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ly leaving the President to appear simply “as a strategic legislative actor,
whose influence over the bureaucracy pales beside that of Congress.”23
Renewed efforts to consider agencies as strategic actors in their own right
are still nascent,24 and continue to lack a contextual examination of incentives during the presidential review process as currently conceived and actually practiced.25
This Article seeks to help further shift the focus from the judiciary to
the executive branch by offering that analysis, illustrating its applications,
and assessing the normative implications. Specifically, it draws upon public choice premises grounded in the straightforward notion that agencies
can choose from different regulatory instruments, each of which will impose varying costs on the executive branch to review and reverse. Increasing reviewing costs will effectively insulate various decisions contained
within a rule, or across a number of rules, since the President will have to
spend his limited resources more selectively, reviewing and reversing fewer decisions. These agency self-insulation instruments are both the means
through which agencies can bypass review as well as raise the political and
resource costs during the review itself. The incentive to engage in strategic behavior, in turn, increases the more an agency expects the President to
disagree with and thus reverse it.26 At the same time, decreases in relative
resources can also have self-insulating effects as well. Because agencies
are repeat players, with self-insulation earning the President’s ire, the strat–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
23 Jerry Mashaw, Public Law and Public Choice Critique and Rapprochement, in RESEARCH
HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND PUBLIC LAW 19, 38 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph
O’Connell eds., 2010); see also Terry M. Moe, The Positive Theory of Public Bureaucracy, in PERSPECTIVES ON PUBLIC CHOICE 455, 473 (Dennis C. Mueller ed., 1997) (observing that “positive theorists have emphasized the courts’ role as backstoppers of Congress . . . . Presidents, who spell trouble
for Congress, have been explored less seriously . . . [as] their control is either downplayed or viewed as
unwarranted.”).
24 See, e.g., GREGORY A. HUBER, THE CRAFT OF BUREAUCRATIC NEUTRALITY 14 (2007); Note,
supra note 22; O’Connell, supra note 7, at 916–22, O’Connell, supra note 21, at 482–87; Alex Acs &
Charles Cameron, Regulatory Auditing at the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (Sept. 13,
2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author). Acs and Cameron model the relationship between OIRA and agencies as an auditing game, where the agency’s choice is between inaction, a
“small,” and an “economically significant” regulation. Id. at 9. Instead of the incentive effects on the
agency (this Article’s focus), however, their main task is to analyze OIRA’s actual targeting decisions.
For an older work in this Article’s tradition, see WILLIAM A. NISKANEN, JR., BUREAUCRACY AND
REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 24–30 (1971), which posits agency behavior in terms of budgetmaximization. But see Daryl J. Levinson, Empire-Building Government in Constitutional Law, 118
HARV. L. REV. 915, 932–34 (questioning Niskanen’s model of bureaucratic behavior).
25 See Robert F. Durant & William G. Resh, Presidential Agendas, Administrative Strategies, and
the Bureaucracy, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE AMERICAN PRESIDENCY 577, 582 (George C.
Edwards III & William G. Howell eds., 2009) (after surveying relevant political science literature, noting that “there is still a great deal we do not know and that merits future research,” including the
“need” for “contextual analyses to improve our understanding of how agencies react strategically to
White House centralization efforts”).
26 The incentive likely persists even when the agency is simply uncertain about those preferences
but wants to avoid the potential review costs.
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egy will be selectively deployed — only when most valuable to the agency.
The full story is, of course, a more subtle one. There are many potential benefits to presidential review that may reduce the incentive to selfinsulate, as well as informal communication avenues preceding formal review that render the prospect infeasible. Self-insulation may thus be the
most prevalent for the broad set of regulatory actions that are not clearly
salient or high-profile, which are likely to come to the attention of the
White House through other means.27 And no doubt, other exogenous actors and oversight mechanisms — most notably from Congress — can cut
against and complicate these dynamics, some of which will be briefly discussed. The narrow focus here, however, will be on the relationship between executive branch agencies and the President under formal regulatory
review, holding all other factors constant; in this sense, the Article presents
a partial equilibrium analysis. One aim is to isolate a robust set of dynamics that can generate compelling (but falsifiable) hypotheses, with a view
toward helping to explain potentially systematic behavioral variation.
Exploring these intraexecutive branch dynamics is valuable in part because they temper two traditional tenets of presidential control. First, the
most robust accounts of a “unitary” executive celebrate a vision of executive power that can be traced to “one, and only one, person,” emphasizing
the accountability-enhancing features of that singular figurehead.28 The
scope of this vision must be qualified, however, by the reality that Presidents delegate regulatory review to a number of agents, mostly within the
Executive Office of the President, who themselves disagree and conflict
over what the President desires. Accountability diminishes when these actors publicly blame each other for unpopular policies from which the President seeks distance.29 In other words, the more the institutional presidency is perceived as a “they” and not an “it,” the more diffuse the blame.30
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
27 See infra Part 0; see also Cass R. Sunstein, The Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs
Myths and Realities, 126 HARV. L. REV. (forthcoming June 2013) (manuscript at 11–12, 35), available
at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2192639 (discussing informal channels through
which OIRA and the White House can be alerted to upcoming rules). The most high-profile rules are
more likely to come to the attention of the White House through informal means and external fire-alarm
oversight, and may thus also gain the most benefits from review in terms of information, expertise, and
political support.
28 STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE 3 (2008); see
also Lawrence Lessig & Cass R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV.
1, 2–3 (1994).
29 See, e.g., Gardiner Harris, White House and the F.D.A. Often at Odds, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 3, 2012,
at A1 (describing various policy conflicts involving, among others, the Deputy Chief of Staff, the FDA
Commissioner, the Secretary of Health and Human Services, and the OIRA Administrator).
30 See JOHN P. BURKE: THE INSTITUTIONAL PRESIDENCY 27–52 (2d. ed. 2000) (discussing institutional features of presidency); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Inside the Administrative State A Critical Look at the Practice of Presidential Control, 105 MICH. L. REV. 47, 49 (2006)
(“Presidential control is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”); Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 3) (“[W]hile the
President is ultimately in charge, the White House itself is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”).
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As such, while this Article speaks of review by the “President” and “presidential review,” the terms are but shorthand for the more complex dynamics of the coordinated, interagency review process within the executive
branch; it refers not to review by the President as an individual, but rather
to that of the institution.
Second, also at stake in these debates is the ability of the President to
sanction defiant agency heads. A look through the U.S. case reporters
would suggest that, at least as a doctrinal matter, the hallmark of such control lies in the President’s removal power. Recently, in Free Enterprise
Fund v. Public Company Accounting Oversight Board, for example, the 5–
4 majority struck down a “dual for-cause” provision of the Sarbanes-Oxley
Act: Congress could not create an entity, the heads of which enjoyed forcause tenure protections, within another agency, the heads of which were
similarly protected.31 The second layer of removal restrictions unconstitutionally blurred the lines of executive responsibility.
By contrast, Justice Breyer’s dissent privileged function over form.32
In his view, the independence of an agency depended on a number of factors, including its separate budgeting and litigating authority and, “above
all, a political environment, reflecting tradition and function, that would
impose a heavy political cost” upon a President seeking to remove without
cause.33 Independence, that is, was a matter of degree that could not be
determined by removal restrictions alone, but rather required a careful assessment of the likely presidential calculations within particular contexts.
One way to understand the majority and dissent’s disagreement is as an
empirical one about the actual determinants of successful agency resistance
to the President: do removal restrictions trump the myriad other factors
that could determine relative bargaining power?34 If not, then courts need
other tools and more systematic ways to think about the concept. By focusing on a subset of agencies without the traditional hallmarks of independence, the executive branch agencies, this analysis provides one such
lens, trained on the ways in which agencies can resist institutionalized
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
31
32
33
34

130 S. Ct. 3138, 3151 (2010).
See id. at 3169, 3183 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
Id. at 3183.
See, e.g., Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies Avoiding Capture Through Institutional Design,
89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 18 (2010) (listing a number of potential “equalizing factors”); Kirti Datla & Richard L. Revesz, Deconstructing Independent Agencies (And Executive Agencies), CORNELL L. REV.
(forthcoming
2013)
(manuscript
at
5–6),
available
at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2125194 (surveying independent and executive
agencies for a “broad set of indicia of independence,” and finding no single common feature); Kevin M.
Stack, The President’s Statutory Powers to Administer the Laws, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 263, 295 (2006)
(arguing that “who is granted express authority under the statute likely influences the relative bargaining positions of the agency and the President”); Adrian Vermeule, Conventions of Agency Independence, COLUM. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 1–2), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2103338 (arguing that agency independence can be
explained by reference to conventions).
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forms of presidential influence amidst resource constraints. In addition, it
also highlights another locus of independence in the more stable federal
bureaucracy, the career civil servants within agencies who may bear many
of the potential reversal costs and thus possess significant incentives to
avoid them. As such, the discussion hopes to join insights from studies
that attempt to understand how agency officials “assess presidential control” and “how it affect[s] their decision-making processes,”35 along with
more top-down analyses of White House control36 and more recent efforts
to clarify the nature of the presidential review process.37 This investigation also seeks to engage the literature on cost-benefit analysis not only as
a set of numbers such as net benefits, but also as a practice — the ways
that agencies, for example, present costs and benefits, and why.38
Moreover, this Article will argue that agency self-insulation can serve
as signals of agency resistance, the normative desirability of which depends on the nature of the underlying statutory scheme at issue. Under
statutes that narrowly constrain policy discretion, self-insulation should be
viewed as more likely to be salutary, as attempts to protect against undue
politicization; thus, in these circumstances, courts should be more willing
to uphold such efforts under either Chevron’s second step or hard look review. By contrast, when statutes authorize broad policy judgments and
call for discretionary interest-balancing, then courts should view selfinsulation as more likely to be unwarranted, now understood as efforts to
avoid democratic accountability. Finally, both courts and Congress should
facilitate political monitoring when strategic behavior or resource constraints have reduced the quality of information about a regulatory action’s
consequences.
Part I introduces an analytic framework focusing on the potential for
principal-agent divergence between agencies and the President as well as
the resulting decision and reviewing costs. Part II further develops this
approach by examining the various regulatory instruments available to a
self-insulating agency and the incentives to choose among them. Specifically, these instruments can functionally serve to bypass review, calibrate
its scrutiny, or truncate the amount of time available — all of which can be
augmented by successful coalition-building attempts. Part III, in turn, examines various responses available to the executive branch, such as direc–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
35
36

Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 62.
See, e.g., Steven Croley, White House Review of Agency Rulemaking An Empirical Investigation,
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 821, 873–76 (2003); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2284–90 (2001).
37 See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 27.
38 See generally MATTHEW D. ADLER & ERIC A. POSNER, NEW FOUNDATIONS OF COSTBENEFIT ANALYSIS (2006); Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Introduction, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 837
(2000).
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tives, spot-checks, and timing strategies, as well as the potential implications for Congress and the courts.
I. FACING PRESIDENTIAL REVIEW
A. Strategic Agencies
One of administrative law’s anxieties is the problem of authority delegated from more politically accountable actors to the unelected ones within
administrative agencies. Concerns that Congress has effectively abdicated
the monitoring of its initial delegation of power, resigned only to “fire
alarm” oversight by interest groups and stymied by collective action problems, only heighten these worries.39 If congressional ex post oversight is
sporadic and ad hoc, some have argued that political actors could nevertheless control bureaucratic discretion by carefully designing the ex ante
structures and processes through which agencies determine policy outcomes.40 One basic premise of these accounts was that procedures could
help promote these outcomes by, for example, stacking the deck towards
preferred interest groups,41 specifying the timing of agency decisions,42 or
otherwise constraining agency discretion.
1. The Limits of Ex Ante Controls. — With much of the attention on the
relationship between Congress and agencies, however, Presidents were,
“for all intents and purposes, left out”43 of many scholarly analyses, primarily characterized as part of the enacting coalition,44 or else notable only
for their indirect influence on legislative calculations, perhaps through later
appointments45 or veto threats.46 In response, some sought to bring the
President firmly back into the picture as a discrete and autonomous actor

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
39 Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked Police Patrols Versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 166 (1984).
40 See Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process, Politics
and Policy Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L. REV. 431,
433–34 (1989).
41 See David Epstein & Sharyn O’Halloran, Administrative Procedures, Information, and Agency
Discretion, 38 AM. J. POL. SCI. 697, 699 (1994); Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R.
Weingast, Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243,
261 (1987); see also Jonathan R. Macey, Organizational Design and the Political Control of Administrative Agencies, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 93, 99–101 (1992).
42 See generally Jacob E. Gersen & Eric A. Posner, Timing Rules and Legal Institutions, 121 HARV.
L. REV. 543 (2007).
43 DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 14 (2003).
44 See, e.g., MURRAY J. HORN, THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION 9
(1995).
45 Id. at 9–10. See also Epstein & O’Halloran, supra note 41, at 698.
46 See John Ferejohn & Charles Shipan, Congressional Influence on Bureaucracy, 6 J.L. ECON &
ORG. 1, 12–17 (1990).
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with his own institutional objectives and mechanisms of control.47 In this
view, sitting atop the institutions that execute and project his power, the
President must delegate tasks to his own agents and assure their fidelity.
These include efforts to “politicize” the bureaucracy through appointments,
along with the related need to remove insubordinates.48
A growing literature, however, has documented some of the pragmatic
realities that blunt the impact of both of these strategies. Appointments
can often arise from patronage motivations as opposed to close ideological
alignment,49 or can prove less effective due to the relative institutional inexperience of the appointees50 or countervailing legislative pressures.51
Similarly, while the power of the President to remove an agency head at
will no doubt bears on the scope of his influence, some have questioned its
actual utility and detailed the obstacles to its use.52 Namely, removals can
exact high political costs, especially when they defy norms or conventions
about the removed party’s perceived need for independence.53 In light of
these limitations, the social science literature has taken a more functional
approach to presidential control, as “the degree of actual or effective control exerted over the agency.”54 These accounts have identified other avenues of presidential influence, such as through budgetary decisions coordinated by the Office of Management and Budget,55 input in agency
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
47 See, e.g., Terry M. Moe & Scott A. Wilson, Presidents and the Politics of Structure, 57 LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS. 1, 13–15 (1994).
48 Political scientists have observed that the percentage of presidential appointees as a share of the
federal workforce has more than doubled since mid-century, peaking in 1980 and increasing during unified governments. See DAVID E. LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS 98
fig.4 2, 202–05 (2008); David E. Lewis, Presidential Appointments and Personnel, 14 ANN. REV. POL.
SCI. 47, 49–50 (2011). Evidence also suggests that efforts to politicize appointments increase when
policy disagreement between the President and agencies is expected to be largest, for example when
comparing efforts after a party change in the next President against situations without such changes.
LEWIS, supra, at 89.
49 See Joshua D. Clinton et al., Separated Powers in the United States The Ideology of Agencies,
Presidents, and Congress, 56 AM. J. POL. SCI. 341, 346, 352 (2012).
50 See LEWIS, THE POLITICS OF PRESIDENTIAL APPOINTMENTS, supra note 48, at 174–89.
51 See Nolan McCarty, The Appointments Dilemma, 48 AM. J. POL. SCI. 413, 413–14 (2004).
52 See Harold H. Bruff, Presidential Power Meets Bureaucratic Expertise, 12 U. PA. J. CONST.
L. 461, 480–82 (2010); Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Saving the Unitary Executive from Those Who Would Distort and Abuse It A Review of The Unitary Executive by Steven G. Calabresi and Christopher S. Yoo,
12 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 593, 607 (2010) (describing numerous examples of when “legal obstacles to the
use of the President’s removal power [we]re insignificant in their effects,” while the “political obstacles
[we]re often formidable”).
53 See Pierce, supra note 52, at 607; Vermeule, supra note 34.
54 Jacob E. Gersen, Designing Agencies, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON PUBLIC CHOICE AND
PUBLIC LAW 333, 347 (Daniel A. Farber & Anne Joseph O’Connell eds., 2010).
55 See SHELLEY LYNNE TOMKIN, INSIDE OMB 117–216 (1998); Christopher R. Berry, Barry C.
Burden & William G. Howell, The President and the Distribution of Federal Spending, 104 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 783, 792–94 (2010) (finding evidence that districts and counties receive more federal outlays
when representives are in the President’s party).
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legislative programs,56 or the relative location of the agency within the
cabinet hierarchy.57
While these structures and processes are important ex ante mechanisms
of control, they still allow for significant agency slack and discretion over
individual rules and regulatory decisions. As a result, numerous Presidents
have opted for more institutionalized and systematic mechanisms of ex
post oversight through regulatory review.58 These agency-cost-reducing
procedures are categorically different from ex ante control mechanisms in
that they allow the President to evaluate and more surgically influence discrete administrative outputs rather than inputs. While appointments and
budgeting, for instance, can help steer the general direction of regulatory
policy, review procedures by their very nature allow the President to reassess the individual outcomes of these efforts after the fact and to react under potentially changed circumstances.59 They allow, that is, for more dynamic and responsive presidential influence.60
In this manner, presidential review can, like appellate court review, be
understood as part of a class of institutional mechanisms that involve more
flexible and situation-specific monitoring by principals distinct from the
enforcement of more rigid ex ante rules.61 As regulatory review becomes
increasingly institutionalized through promulgated procedures and standards, it also becomes more predictable relative to more ad hoc methods of
ex post monitoring. The process is thus more likely to give rise to sustained patterns of strategic behavior on the part of covered actors the longer these procedures are in place.
2. Presidential Review. — The current structure of presidential review
has, for the most part, persisted for almost twenty years, since 1993 when
President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866.62 While these governing
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
See ANDREW RUDALEVIGE, MANAGING THE PRESIDENT’S PROGRAM 5–8 (2002).
LEWIS, supra note 43, at 44–45.
See Alan E. Wiseman, Delegation and Positive-Sum Bureaucracies, 71 J. POL. 998, 999–1000
(2009).
59 See STEVEN P. CROLEY, REGULATION AND PUBLIC INTERESTS 97 (2008) (noting that “whereas the president lacks the ability to veto selective pieces of legislation, he enjoys a ‘line-item veto,’ so
to speak, of agencies’ regulatory initiatives”). Of course, over time, one could also understand personnel and funding efforts as ways of disciplining an agency based on a broad review of its policies or particularly salient ones, but these mechanisms are too blunt and static for this purpose, and thus better
understood as prospective, rather than retrospective, tools. See, e.g., Daniel F. Spulber & David
Besanko, Delegation, Commitment, and the Regulatory Mandate, 8 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 126, 127 (1992)
(“The appointment of the agency director and senior staff guides the future direction of the agency.”).
60 See William F. West, The Institutionalization of Regulatory Review Organizational Stability and
Responsive Competence at OIRA, 35 PRESIDENTIAL STUDIES Q. 76, 78 (2005).
61 See Jeffrey S. Banks, Agency Budgets, Cost Information, and Auditing, 33 AM. J. POL. SCI. 670
(1989); Matthew C. Stephenson, Information Acquisition and Institutional Design, 124 HARV. L. REV.
1422, 1454 (2011) (categorizing both appellate review and executive review of rulemaking as examples
of “settings [where] the principal can only establish forms of review in which the overseer makes whatever decision is optimal ex post, rather than enforcing a set of rules that would be optimal ex ante”).
62 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
56
57
58
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procedures are the focus of this Article, some brief historical context will
be useful. Presidential oversight efforts date back centuries,63 though President Reagan was arguably the first to exert more supervisory control
“self-consciously and openly”64 when he issued Executive Order 12,291 in
1981.65 Among other things, the order required executive agencies to
submit proposed and final rules to the Office of Management and Budget
(OMB),66 a role delegated thereafter to the then newly-established Office
of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA).67 For a subset of these
rules, those deemed “major,”68 agencies also had to submit a “regulatory
impact analysis”: the agency’s description of the rule’s anticipated costs
and benefits, net benefits, and the potential alternatives considered.69
These innovations were reinforced four years later when President
Reagan issued Executive Order 12,498, which now allowed OMB to exert
its influence earlier in the regulatory process in conjunction with agencies’
political appointees.70 The order required executive agencies to submit a
“regulatory program” for review each year that covered all of their significant regulatory actions underway or planned.71 The President now had an
opportunity to influence the regulatory process during its planning, proposal, and final stages.
While George H.W. Bush’s Administration continued under the Reagan
executive orders, President Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 in 1993,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
63 See, e.g., Jerry L. Mashaw, Recovering American Administrative Law Federalist Foundations,
1787–1801, 115 YALE L.J. 1256, 1304–06 (2006) (describing various examples, for instance, that
“[President] Washington imposed his will through a consistent style of broad consultation, independent
judgment, and continuous oversight”); Kagan, supra note 36, at 2272–77; see also Jim Tozzi, OIRA’s
Formative Years The Historical Record of Centralized Regulatory Review Preceding OIRA’s Founding,
63 ADMIN L. REV. 37, 39 (2011) (arguing that “centralized review was developed and implemented by
OMB” during “fifteen years preceding OIRA”).
64 Kagan, supra note 36, at 2277.
65 See Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981).
66 See id. § 3(c).
67 See id. § (6)(b). Created under the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980, OIRA is located within the
Executive Office of the President (EOP), and specifically, the Office of Management and Budget. See
Pub. L. No 96-511, § 3503, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended in 44 U.S.C. ch. 35 (2006)); see U.S.
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-03-929, RULEMAKING: OMB’S ROLE IN REVIEWS OF
AGENCIES’ DRAFT RULES AND THE TRANSPARENCY OF THOSE REVIEWS 17–18 (2003) [hereinafter
GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY].
68 Specifically, section 1(b) of the order defined a major rule as “any regulation that is likely to result in: (1) [a]n annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more; (2) [a] major increase in costs or
prices for consumers, individual industries, Federal, State, or local government agencies, or geographic
regions; or (3) [s]ignificant adverse effects on competition, employment, investment, productivity, innovation, or on the ability of United States-based enterprises to compete with foreign-based enterprises
in domestic or export markets.” Exec. Order No. 12,291, § 1(b), 3 C.F.R. 127, 127–28 (1981).
69 Id. § 3(c)–(d).
70 See Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985); James F. Blumstein, Regulatory Review By the
Executive Office of the President An Overview and Policy Analysis of Current Issues, 51 DUKE L. J.
851, 867 (2001).
71 Exec. Order No. 12,498, § 1, 3 C.F.R. 323 (1985), reprinted in 5 U.S.C. § 601(1988), revoked by
Exec. Order No. 12,866.
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which contained several noteworthy changes relevant here.72 First, unlike
the previous regime that reviewed all regulations, executive branch agencies now only had to submit those rules that were the most “significant,”
demarcating a reduced scope of review.73 The effort was an attempt to
make the process more selective “so as to focus resources on the most important.”74
Second, those rules that were “economically significant” were required
to provide an especially thorough regulatory impact analysis.75 Such rules
effectively heightened the scrutiny of review as well as the amount of information available for it. Third, since agencies and other commentators
had accused OIRA of unduly delaying regulations, the order now established a presumptive timetable: it expected review to be complete within
90 days, but allowed the OMB Director to extend that period for another
30 days at the request of the agency.76 Fourth, the order also contained a
number of dispute resolution provisions for “disagreements or conflicts between or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency that
[could not] be resolved by the [OIRA Administrator] . . . .”77 Specifically,
such disputes were to be resolved by the President or the Vice President
acting at the President’s request.78
Finally, the order specified general standards of review. Namely, it
called for consistency with the “President’s priorities,” the prevention of
“conflict” with “policies or actions taken or planned by another agency,”
as well as adherence to the “principles set forth in this Executive Order.”79
One of the most important principles was that the “benefits of the intended
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
72
73

Exec. Order 12,866, 3 C.F.R. 638 (1993).
Id. § (6)(a)(3)(A). Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), with minor exceptions, covers all agencies
except those “considered to be independent regulatory agencies” as defined by a provision of the Paperwork Reduction Act. 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10) (1988). See Arthur Fraas & Randall Lutter, On the
Economic Analysis of Regulations at Independent Regulation Commissions, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 213,
214–15 (2011). Cf. Exec. Order 12,866 § 4(b)-(c) (requiring independent regulatory agencies to submit
Regulatory Agenda and Plan).
74 Kagan, supra note 36, at 2287; see also Sally Katzen, OIRA at Thirty Reflections and Recommendations, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 103, 105 (2011) (noting process was “more selective”).
75 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–46 (1993). Circular A-4, in turn,
states that “Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regulatory analysis for economically
significant regulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(1).” See Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec.
Office of the President, Circular A-4, Regulatory Analysis (2003) (hereinafter Circular A-4), available
at http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-4; Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 13) (describing “Regulatory Impact Analysis’ as “a careful and detailed account of the costs and benefits of
economically significant rules”).
76 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(2)(B)–(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647 (1993). Review of “notices of inquiry, advance notices of proposed rulemaking, or other preliminary regulatory actions prior to a Notice
of Proposed Rulemaking” were to be completed within 10 working days of submission. Id.
§ 6(b)(2)(A).
77 Id. § 7.
78 Id.
79 Id. § 2(b).
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regulation justify its costs,”80 while another demanded the “best reasonably
obtainable scientific, technical, economic, and other information” regarding regulatory consequences.81 In this manner, the order distinguished between what might be called political review, those issues raised as part of
the president’s agenda and priorities, and analytical review: how agencies
evaluate the costs and benefits of regulatory options, justify the choices
among them, and consider a host of other technical issues.82
As an indication of just how entrenched these procedures had become,
President George W. Bush left Clinton’s executive order virtually unmodified for most of his Administration. In 2002, however, he issued an order
that transferred various vice presidential functions to the White House
chief of staff or OMB Director, but otherwise left the previous text unchanged.83 It was not until January 2007, about thirteen years since President Clinton’s intervention, that President Bush imposed more substantive
amendments.84 On January 30, 2009, however, President Obama withdrew
the Bush amendments and returned to the original and unamended Clinton
executive order.85 In January 2011, he issued Executive Order 13,563,
which, among other things, “reaffirm[ed] the principles, structures, and
definitions governing contemporary regulatory review” and modernized
many of its provisions.86 As such, with the exception of about two years
under President George W. Bush, the formal procedures first established
under President Clinton in 1993 continue to operate today.87
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
80 Id. § 1(b)(6). That determination could consider both “quantifiable” as well as “qualitative” costs
and benefits, factors that were “difficult to quantify, but nevertheless essential to consider.” Id. § 1(a).
81 Id. § 1(b)(7).
82 See Stuart Shapiro, Unequal Partners Cost-Benefit Analysis and Executive Review of Regulations, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,433, 10,433–34 (2005) (distinguishing between “OIRA’s role as the eyes
and ears of the president in overseeing regulatory agencies” and its “analytical mission”). On the one
hand, “the review process will ask how and if the rule fits with the law and with presidential commitments, goals, and priorities.” Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 30); on the other hand, it will also
concern more “technical” issues such as the “accuracy” of costs and benefits, the “avoidance of unjustified costs,” as well as (1) alternatives; (2) the need to seek public comments; (3) logical outgrowth issues; (4) the need for interim final rules; (5) statutory process requirements; and (6) scientific issues.
Id. at 30–31.
83 Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2002).
84 Among the most important, the amendments now required agencies to identify “market failure[s]” in writing, specified that Regulatory Policy Officers within agencies had to be political appointees who served as gatekeepers for new rulemakings and, finally, explicitly extended regulatory review
to guidance documents. Exec. Order No. 13,422, §§ 1(a), 5(b), 7, 3 C.F.R. 191, 191–93 (2007). For an
argument that the “ultimate impact of the Bush amendments” was “largely symbolic,” see Cary
Coglianese, The Rhetoric and Reality of Regulatory Reform, 25 YALE J. ON REG. 85, 85 (2008).
85 See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 74 Fed. Reg. 6113 (Jan. 30, 2009).
86 See Exec. Order No. 13,563 §§ 1(b), 2–6, 3 C.F.R. 215, 215–17 (2011). See also Exec. Order
No. 13,579, §§ 1(b)–(c), 3 C.F.R. 256, 257 (2011) (providing that independent agencies “should” similarly “promote” and “comply” with many of the general principles).
87 See generally Richard H. Pildes & Cass R. Sunstein, Reinventing the Regulatory State, 62 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1, 16–28 (1995) (describing the procedural innovations introduced by President Clinton).
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B. Resource-Centered Insulation
Given the prospect of presidential review as practiced in its current
form for almost two decades, it is reasonable to expect that executive
branch agencies, and especially the career staff within them, have learned
to manage and adapt to the process in accordance with their own aims.
Administrative agencies are bureaucracies as traditionally conceived, and
such bureaucracies have long been known to create routines and strategies
for new requirements imposed upon them.88 As such, it is fruitful to think
about agency behavior relative to the President’s in terms of their respective resource constraints, and the differential costs and payoffs for the options available to actors (like agencies) that initiate review and the actors
(like the institutional President) that review them. These concepts, originally developed by Emerson Tiller and Pablo Spiller for the purposes of
understanding agency interaction with judicial review,89 yield fresh perspectives when applied to the presidential context.
1. Strategic Self-Insulation. — The basic insight pursued in depth here
is that resource-constrained agencies can choose among various regulatory
forms and strategies to achieve their desired results, while at the same time
making it more difficult for the institutional President to review and reverse them. Specifically, they can make such review more difficult by increasing the costs of review, thereby forcing the President to spend his limited resources more selectively such that he reverses fewer decisions and
affirms the rest. In this manner, agency instruments that increase reviewing costs effectively serve to insulate discrete decisions within a rule, or
across rules.
Holding other factors constant, agencies will be more likely to selfinsulate the greater their perceived preference divergence from the President. In other words, one would expect to observe self-insulation more
when the agency expects the President to be an enemy (to have different
preferences), rather than an ally (with the same preferences); the agency
seeks to shield decisions more from the former relative to the latter.90
Moreover, because agencies are repeat players that would undoubtedly
earn the executive branch’s displeasure after recurrent and brazen attempts
to self-insulate, they are most likely to do so when it would be the most
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
88 See JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY 221–32 (1989) (discussing how bureaucracies adapt to
innovations); see generally CORNELL G. HOOTON, EXECUTIVE GOVERNANCE: PRESIDENTIAL ADMINISTRATIONS AND POLICY CHANGE IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 5 (1997) (examining the
“patterns of attention and concern among career officials and on the organizational factors that shape
the ability of departmental bureaus to adopt new activities”).
89 See Emerson H. Tiller, Resource-Based Strategies in Law and Positive Political Theory CostBenefit Analysis and the Like, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 1453, 1461–62 (2002); Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3,
at 352–62.
90 See, e.g., Jacob E. Gersen & Adrian Vermeule, Delegating to Enemies, 113 COLUM. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (using terminology).
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valuable to them — when the probability of reversal is greatest but not
certain, when decision costs and resource investment are relatively high, or
more generally, when agencies receive the most benefit from doing so.
To help motivate this account, begin by considering a familiar analogy:
that of trial judges who seek to avoid reversal upon appellate review. Reversals can impose real resource costs on trial judges in the form of new
trials or motions on remand, and they can impose reputational costs as
well.91 Trial judges thus have strong incentives to insulate their decisions
and minimize the probability of reversal. A trial judge might do so, for
example, by writing an opinion that turns more heavily on a finding of fact
rather a question of law in order to take advantage of a more favorable
standard upon appellate review (say, “clearly erroneous” instead of “de novo”).92 To reverse this decision, the appellate judge would thus have to
use more resources to examine the record and describe her rationale in
greater detail, given the more deferential standard. As a result, a resourceconstrained appellate judge would have less incentive to reverse this factbound decision. In this manner, the trial judge would have insulated her
decision.
So too can administrative agencies self-insulate under presidential review. Of course, the analogy is imperfect; for starters, judges have life
tenure, a lack of mission-orientation, and so on. The nature of judicial reversal is also less iterative and dynamic than in the presidential context, as
we shall see.93 But the analogy not coincidental either: the “basic modalities of [presidential] review” since Reagan’s executive order have been
“drawn, perhaps unconsciously, from appellate court review of agency
rules.”94 Those modalities themselves, in turn, “borrowed from the understandings that govern the relationship between appeals courts and trial
courts in civil litigation.”95 In other words, presidential review was designed with the appellate court review model in mind.96 As in that model,
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
91 See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati & Eric A. Posner, What Do Federal District Judges Want? An
Analysis of Publications, Citations, and Reversals, 28 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 518, 518–19 (2011); Evan H.
Caminker, Precedent and Prediction The Forward-Looking Aspects of Inferior Court Decisionmaking,
73 TEX. L. REV. 1, 77–78 (1994); David A. Hoffman, Alan J. Izenman & Jeffrey R. Lidicker, Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 681, 702–03 (2007).
92 See HARRY T. EDWARDS & LINDA A. ELLIOTT, FEDERAL COURTS STANDARDS OF REVIEW
19, 23 (2007); Nicola Gennaioli & Andrei Shleifer, Judicial Fact Discretion, 37 J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 3
(2008). Cf. Max M. Schanzenbach & Emerson H. Tiller, Strategic Judging Under the U.S. Sentencing
Guidelines Positive Political Theory and Evidence, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 24, 24–25 (2006) (hypothesizing that sentencing judges pursue policy preferences, in part, by making fact-oriented determinations
that garner a deferential standard of review).
93 See infra Part 0.ii.
94 See E. Donald Elliott, TQM-ing OMB Or Why Regulatory Review Under Executive Order
12,291 Works Poorly and What President Clinton Should Do About It, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
167, 170 (1994).
95 See Thomas W. Merrill, Article III, Agency Adjudication, and the Origins of the Appellate Review
Model of Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L. REV. 939, 940 (2011).
96 See Elliott, supra note 94, at 170.
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review occurs as a matter of ex post oversight after many of the major
substantive and procedural decisions, whether during trials or agency ruledrafting. have already been made. In this sense, both appellate court and
presidential review represent opportunities for strategic behavior, “where
the ability to manipulate the instruments of decision making, rather than
merely selecting policy choices, allows actors to insulate their policy
choices from higher level review.”97
To explore these implications in greater depth, the remaining analysis
will largely treat agencies and the President as unitary actors with exogenous preferences, though it will later relax some of these assumptions.
These simplifications allow for greater initial, analytic traction and are also
reasonable as a first approximation: agencies move first when they submit
a regulatory action for review in anticipation of what they know (or think
they know) about the President’s preferences before the review process begins.98 Even when those predictions may be wrong, the uncertainties
about what the agency may discover during a costly review can be incentive enough to engage in self-insulation. As others have noted, the process
was mainly “designed as an end-of-the-pipeline check against poorly conceived regulations,”99 thus “operating as a kind of last-minute barrier to
action at a point when cooperation and trust are nearly impossible.”100 In
other words, while endogenous preference-shifting by both the agency and
the President is possible and undoubtedly occurs,101 the structure and constraints of the review process can often make the prospect more difficult.
Of course, in reality, the “agency” and the “President” are not singular
entities; rather, they are institutions. Institutions have multiple actors with–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
97
98

Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 349.
See Huber, supra note 24, at 24 (discussing “notions of bureaucratic anticipation” whereby bureaucrats can “alter the status quo policy over which external political bargaining takes place” by “moving first”).
99 Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Making Sense of Regulation: 2001
Report to Congress on the Costs and Benefits of Regulations and Unfunded Mandates on State, Local,
and
Tribal
Entities
43,
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/omb/inforeg/costbenefitreport.pdf.
100 Pildes & Sunstein, supra note 87, at 16. In Bressman and Vandenbergh’s interviews:
Some EPA respondents commented that OIRA review occurs too late in the rule-making process. OIRA “is a reactive organization. It receives rules over the transom that agencies have already
prepared. [OIRA has] ninety days to review [the rules and] on the eighty-ninth day, they say ‘we don’t
like it, do over.’ Early interaction would be helpful so that we don’t waste each other’s time.”
Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 95–96 (alterations in original).
101 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 10) (recalling “countless instances in which the process of interagency comment during OIRA review, or the agency’s own continuing consideration of the
underlying issues, leads the agency to make changes quickly and with enthusiasm”); id. at 18 (stating
that “[i]t is possible . . . that technical experts at the rulemaking agency will decide to revise their analysis and even their conclusions in light of insights provided by other technical experts”). His account
emphasizes the ways in which an agency’s views can and do shift during the review process in response
to the “dispersed information inside and outside the federal government” aggregated during review. Id.
at 35. Future work should accordingly extend this framework to incorporate more fully the endogenous
preferences of the agency and the President.
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in them, each playing various roles. First, consider the “agency” (we will
consider the “President” in more depth too, but much later). Agencies
have career staff with tenure protections and no expressed political loyalties,102 as well as agency heads appointed by the President, subject to typically deferential Senate approval, and removable at will.103 But if the
President appoints executive branch agency heads and can fire them without cause, why would one ever expect agency and presidential preferences
to diverge? The short answer is that the President and his agency heads
suffer from familiar principal-agent problems, which can be exacerbated
by similar issues between agency heads and their career staff.104 Indeed,
while this story is in part about the potential conflict between the President
and his appointees, it is perhaps even more so about the incentives of the
quasi-independent federal bureaucracy relative to its multiple overseers.
First, even the most faithful civil servants and loyal agency heads may
have divergent preferences due to knowledge about what they perceive
(rightly or wrongly) as more refined information about implementation difficulties or political sensitivities.105 Because of the transaction costs of
briefing and elevating issues, such information may be difficult to fully
convey to superiors. This agency head or civil servant may thus resist entreaties due to constraints “of which the Executive [or the appointee] is only dimly aware.”106 Moreover, many decisions are necessarily made at the
career staff level and never elevated, despite what could be the contrary
wishes of agency heads or the President, had they been informed of the issues. This prospect need not be a pernicious one, but can also be a function of limited resources and the need to prioritize among issues worthy of
higher-level attention. Alternatively, such divergence may also arise because of the President’s own transaction costs in communicating his priorities and having them filter down multiple levels in ways that facilitate fully informed elevation of an issue.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
102 See Ronald N. Johnson & Gary D. Libecap, The Federal Civil Service System and the Problem
of Bureaucracy 7 (1994) (“[Career employees] have strict tenure guarantees, have no expressed ties to
the administration or to Congress, and by law are to be politically neutral.”).
103 Of course, this is itself a simplification. As Ronald N. Johnson and Gary D. Libecap explain:
Distinctions must be made among political appointees, who hold the top positions in most agencies; senior career officials, who hold positions in the Senior Executive Service (SES) or have top management General Schedule positions . . . within the civil service; and the rank-and-file career workforce . . . . These three groups have very different incentives for policy administration and operate
under different constraints within the bureaucracy.
See id. at 7. For another more nuanced discussion of internal agency dynamics, see Magill &
Vermeule, supra note 2.
104 Much empirical evidence supports the notion that the preferences of career civil servants within
an agency diverge from those of political appointees. See, e.g., Clinton, supra note 49, at 345–46.
105 See Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106
Colum. L. Rev. 1260, 1302–03 (2006).
106 Id. at 1303.
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Moreover, there is the well-known prospect of bureaucratic capture —
the notion that agency actors, both career and political, may become beholden to external special interests, whether the regulated industry or
broader public interest groups.107 The notorious “revolving door” between
agencies and industry only reinforces this concern.108 Alternatively, career staff may have been hired or may have self-selected due to the agency’s single-mission orientation, bringing to the job a narrowly focused
zeal.109 They may in turn influence political appointees who may end up
“go[ing] native” and supporting the views of their entrenched staff.110 Finally, the difficulties of the confirmation process, especially under divided
government, may also result in appointees whose preferences are not fully
aligned with the President due to the compromises struck with Congress.111
In a similar vein, a host of dynamic, exogenous factors — including
pressure from congressional committees and interest groups — will also
increase the prospect of disagreement for individual rules. For any of
these reasons, there is the potential for preference divergence between the
President and even his most loyal appointed agency heads or faithful career staff. Putting the cover back on the agency again, this analysis will
assume that agencies as a unit behave accordingly; opportunities for preference divergence abound.
At the same time, Presidents and agencies — like trial judges and appellate courts — make decisions with limited resources. Thus, understanding the costs each incurs by initiating and reviewing an action are critical
to appreciating their respective incentives. Call these decision costs for the
agency and reviewing costs for the President.112 Both kinds of costs include the resources necessary to acquire, synthesize, and deliberate over
the information necessary to reach a rational conclusion, as well as the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
107 See generally, e.g., Paul J. Quirk, Industry Influence in Federal Regulatory Agencies (1981).
According to this argument, regulated industries have the resources, incentives, and information necessary to influence agency career staff or political appointees. Similarly, public interest groups are also
influential given their ability to marshal publicity and political pressure. See Michael E. Levine & Jennifer L. Forrence, Regulatory Capture, Public Interest, and the Public Agenda Toward a Synthesis, 6
J.L. Econ. & Org. 167, 169 (1990); Bruce A. Ackerman & William T. Hassler, Clean Coal/Dirty Air
(1981) (discussing role of industry and public interest groups).
108 Quirk, supra note 107, at 143–74.
109 See David B. Spence, Administrative Law and Agency Policy-Making Rethinking the Positive
Theory of Political Control, 14 Yale J. on Reg. 407, 424 (1997) (“[A]n agency with a well-defined mission will tend to attract bureaucrats whose goals are sympathetic to that mission.”); Bagley & Revesz,
supra note 105, at 1300–02.
110 Elliott, supra note 94, at 176. These views may be particularly informed by some career staff
that have spent decades or even their entire careers at the agency, perhaps becoming heavily invested in
the release of internally resource-intensive regulatory actions. See Cornelius M. Kerwin & Scott R.
Furlong, Rulemaking 129–164 (4th ed. 2011) (discussing complex and resource-intensive processes for
managing the internal agency development of rules).
111 See generally McCarty, supra note 51.
112 The term “decision cost” is used by Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 351.
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costs of communicating that conclusion. Say, for example, that the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is required by statute to ensure that
cooling water intake structures reflect the “best technology available for
minimizing adverse environmental impact.”113 In considering how to fulfill this statutory mandate for existing structures, the EPA might engage in
outreach through public meetings and it might conduct research on how
cooling water intake structures damage the environment. After studying
the problem, the EPA might determine that there are various technologies
available to reduce the number of fish and other species killed in these
structures (for example, such as mesh screens, or barrier nets), and that
some technologies are more effective than others and should be used accordingly. The costs of arriving at this decision constitute the EPA’s decision costs.
After it has decided on an outcome, an agency must also decide what
means, or instruments, it will use to pursue and communicate that outcome.114 As we shall see, these instruments include the literature’s familiar catalogue of adjudication, guidance documents, and rulemaking.115 But
this set will also be broadened to consider the institutional dimensions of
these instruments and others as well: for example, how the instruments are
characterized by agencies (their significance determinations), the quality of
information conveyed by their accompanying cost-benefit analyses, various
timing decisions, and the internal coalitions built in support of an agency’s
action.
Returning to our simple example, once the EPA decides to regulate
cooling water intake structures to reduce environmental harm, it can pursue this approach through discrete, permitting decisions; a guidance document describing various available technologies for facility-specific determinations;116 or by eventually undertaking a rulemaking to set a standard
or to mandate a particular technology.117 All of these instruments vary in
their form and impact, and the discretion to use them can be constrained
by statute; such a statute may dictate specific forms of action, the substance, or else provide directive timelines, among other restrictions. Within these bounds, agencies will consider decision costs for themselves, as
well as the reviewing costs the chosen instrument imposes on the executive
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
113 This hypothetical is based loosely on the situation facing the EPA in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498 (2009).
114 Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 351.
115 See, e.g., Magill, supra note 3, at 1396 (examining consequences of “administrative adjudication,
legislative rulemaking, or the issuance of a guidance document”).
116 See, e.g., U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Office of Water Enforcement Permits Div., Draft Guidance for
Evaluating the Adverse Impact of Cooling Water Intake Structures on the Aquatic Environment: Section
316(b) P.L. 92-500 (1977).
117 See Entergy, 129 S. Ct. at 1503–04 (describing the EPA’s use of permitting decisions, guidance
documents, and eventually rulemaking); Brief for the Federal Parties as Respondents Supporting Petitioners at 5–7, Entergy, 129 S. Ct. 1498 (Nos. 07-588, 07-589 and 07-597).
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branch. In other words, faced with the prospect of presidential review,
agencies can choose among various instruments to advance their regulatory
policies, but their choice will depend on the relative effectiveness of these
instruments as well as the costs they expect to impose on the President to
review them.
To illustrate, say there is a Republican President in power who has
campaigned on reducing the number of regulations and blocking the number of costly new ones. The EPA knows that if it decides to pursue a policy through its permitting decisions for cooling water intake structures, then
these adjudicatory decisions will not be subject to presidential review and
are thus immune from reversal. If the EPA chooses the guidance document route, however, the EPA knows that the executive branch might review the document, but that it will be more difficult to reverse since the
document is not legally binding and so its effects are unclear. For the
same reasons, however, the instrument will be less effective in bringing
about its desired policy changes. Alternatively, the EPA is also aware that
if it undertakes a rulemaking, it will likely be required to prepare a resource-intensive cost-benefit analysis. Because of the Republican President’s business-friendly stance, the EPA is concerned that preparing a thorough cost-benefit analysis may make it easier for the rule to be reversed
since the analysis could reveal expensive burdens on industry.
With these various choices, agencies can insulate their decisions from
review by increasing the costs of review, thus decreasing the probability of
reversal due to the President’s finite resource constraints. In our example,
the EPA could choose to issue a guidance document instead of a rule to reduce the policy’s visibility, therefore increasing the difficulty of review and
reversal by the Republican President; but doing so would also bring about
its policy changes less effectively given the nonbinding nature of guidance
documents. Alternatively, the EPA could produce a poor-quality costbenefit analysis when submitting a rule, thus increasing the costs of review. Both of these strategies would be examples of self-insulation, since
in both cases the President would have to spend greater resources to identify, review, and justify a reversal.
To avoid reversal, then, agencies may trade off their own “institutional
efficiency” — the ability to achieve some outcome through a lower-cost
instrument in favor of a higher-cost one118 — provided that the selected
instrument imposes even greater reviewing costs on the executive
branch.119 In other words, agencies will pursue a policy as close to its
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
118 Agency adjudication and guidance documents, for example, yield lower impacts given that agencies must proceed on a case-by-case basis or else rely on legally nonbinding guidance to advance a regulatory policy. By contrast, rulemaking is more effective in implementing a policy, though the absolute
degree of that impact will depend on the substance of the rule. See Colin S. Diver, Policymaking Paradigms in Administrative Law, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 393 (1981).
119 See Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 351–52.
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preferences as possible, through a strategic instrument choice that takes into account, among other things, the costs imposed upon the reviewer and
the corresponding likelihood of presidential reversal.
2. Presidential Reversals. — The power to review implies the ability to
examine something again (“re-view”) as well as the authority to instruct an
agent or subordinate based on that evaluation.120 Whether that presidential
authority is directive or supervisory is a matter of much academic debate,121 but as a practical matter against the backdrop of at-will removal,
presidential review shares several structural similarities with judicial review. Namely, OIRA can effectively reverse an agency action on behalf of
the President and his interagency reviewers in a number of ways.122 Just
as agencies can choose regulatory instruments, the President also has various reversal instruments at his disposal. They are “reversals” in the sense
that the interagency-review process can result in revisions or changes that
the agency does not otherwise prefer, but to which it will make due to the
threat of delay or return, or because of resource constraints.123 These reversal instruments can be arrayed in terms of their respective reviewing
costs, which increase the more public the reversal and correspondingly, the
more reasoned the explanation required for it.
To begin, OIRA can “return” a rule to an agency “for further consideration of some or all of its provisions.”124 While this procedure is infre–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
120 See Black’s Law Dictionary 1434 (9th ed. 2009) (defining “review” as the “[c]onsideration, inspection, or reexamination of a subject or thing” as well as the “[p]lenary power to direct and instruct
an agent or subordinate, including the right to remand, modify, or vacate any action by the agent or
subordinate, or to act directly in place of the agent or subordinate”).
121 See, e.g., Peter L. Strauss, Foreword Overseer, or “The Decider”? The President in Administrative Law, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 696, 697 (2007); Robert V. Percival, Who’s in Charge? Does the
President Have Directive Authority over Agency Regulatory Decisions?, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 2487,
2488–90 (2011); Thomas O. McGarity, Presidential Control of Regulatory Agency Decisionmaking, 36
AM. U. L. REV. 443, 462 (1987). Some have also argued that the President also possesses what Professors Peter Strauss and Cass Sunstein have called “procedural” supervisory authority over agency heads
from whom the President can demand information and engage in consultation. See Peter L. Strauss &
Cass R. Sunstein, The Role of the President and OMB in Informal Rulemaking, 38 ADMIN. L. REV.
181, 200 (1986); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1 (granting President the authority to “require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating
to the Duties of their respective Offices”). Indeed, this argument heavily informed the Office of Legal
Counsel memorandum authorizing President Reagan’s regulatory review executive order. See Proposed
Exec. Order Entitled “Federal Regulation,” 5 Op. O.L.C., 59, 63 (1981). Practically speaking, these
reversal mechanisms are also powerfully backed by the “de facto veto” inherent in the President’s atwill removal power, as well as the authority accorded by executive order. But this is not to say that
such formal authority need be explicitly invoked in order for it to still have effect. See Ethan Bueno de
Mesquita & Matthew C. Stephenson, Regulatory Quality Under Imperfect Oversight, 101 AM. POL.
SCI. REV. 605, 606 n.5 (2007).
122 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 9–10).
123 By implication, this category and analysis does not include those situations where agency preferences are endogenous and shift as a result of the interagency review process, such that the agency accepts the revisions “quickly and with enthusiasm.” See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 10);
supra note 101.
124 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(b)(C)(3), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647 (1993).
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quently invoked, the threat is real and has, at times, been vigorously exercised. For each return, the Administrator of OIRA provides a “return letter”125 that contains “a written explanation for such return.”126 The parallel to judicial reversal and remand is likely clear. Aside from agency-head
removal, return letters are the most costly reversal instrument because they
require a public rationale. During the first seven years after President
Clinton issued Executive Order 12,866 — from 1994 to 2000 — OIRA returned only a handful of the 500 to 700 rules for which it coordinated review: three rules in 1995, and four in 1997.127 Under the subsequent Bush
Administration, by contrast, OIRA publicly posted forty-two return letters
explaining various disagreements with the agencies’ rules.128 To date, the
Obama Administration has issued only one.129 This pattern could suggest
that more anti-regulatory Presidents incur fewer political costs relative to
pro-regulatory ones when issuing public return letters.
At the same time, however, “it is misleading to focus on the number of
return letters as a measure of OIRA’s impact,” since executive branch reviewers may still be “acting aggressively” in their absence.130 Indeed, as
part of the review process, interagency and White House reviewers can also negotiate revisions to a draft rule before agreeing to a version upon
which to conclude review with these changes. Each time there is another
round of comments or edits from reviewers, OIRA compiles and “transmit[s]” them back to the agency.131 The agency can respond to these
comments, make revisions, and circulate a new draft during the review period, if it so chooses and to the extent time permits.132
Regulatory submissions have a host of elements, including preambles,
new and revised regulatory text, alternatives, effective dates, statutory interpretations, as well as cost-benefit estimates, among other provisions.
The regulatory actions can also take different forms, for example, as advance notices of proposed rulemaking or as interim final rules, and so on.
Each of these agency “decisions” within a rule or about the form of a rule
can be the subject of comment and possible reversal during the interagency
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 5.
Id.
See GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 42 fig.5. There were no return letters
in 1994, 1996, 1998, 1999, and 2000. Id.
128 Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing “Political” Oversight of Agency Decision Making, 108 MICH. L.
REV. 1127, 1150 (2010).
129 See Letter from Cass R. Sunstein, Adm’r of the Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, to Lisa
Jackson, Adm’r of the Envtl. Prot. Agency (Sept. 2, 2011), available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/ozone_national_ambient_air_quality_standards_letter.pdf.
130 Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 9 n.35).
131 Id. at 20.
132 See U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, IMPROVEMENTS NEEDED TO MONITORING AND
EVALUATION OF RULES DEVELOPMENT AS WELL AS TO THE TRANSPARENCY OF OMB REGULATORY REVIEWS 53–90 (2009) [hereinafter GAO MONITORING & TRANSPARENCY] (describing sixteen
case studies of selected rules and changes due to presidential review).
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review process. These revisions can be loosely analogized to the multiple
reversals and remands with instructions after judicial review in the course
of serial litigation.133 Sometimes these multiple rounds of revision and interagency review can be lengthy, resulting in significant delays.134
To put this category of reversals into perspective, even seemingly minor revisions may upend the product of hard-won compromises with agencies and external constituencies (including legislative staff, industry, and
interest groups) as well as internal agency stakeholders amongst career
staff and policy officials (including lawyers, economists, scientists, and
policy analysts).135 Agencies, which have often spent sizeable resources
throughout the rulemaking process, can be loathe to see these hard-won
balances upset and their work overturned. Of course, they may be indifferent to particular revisions when the stakes are low; in other situations,
however, the threat of reversal is costly and real.
As for these reversal costs, the effective ability to insist on these revisions will depend on the amount of political capital and resources required.
Specifically, they will be a function of the resources necessary to communicate the issue to the agency or other interagency reviewers, whether
in terms of briefings or meetings, as well as the political capital necessary
to elevate the issue to higher-level officials and, ultimately, to refuse to
conclude upon the rule in its current form.136 Evidence from a 2003 Government Accountability Office (GAO) report suggests that presidential reversals, even within a rule, are nontrivial in effect. Specifically, the report
finds that the review process resulted in “significant” or “material” changes to fifty-one of the subset of eighty-five rules examined (sixty percent).137 The report defined these changes as those made at a reviewer’s
suggestion that “affected the scope, impact, or estimated costs and benefits” of the submitted rules, or “resulted in the addition or deletion of material in the explanatory preamble section of the rule.”138
In addition to these dispositions, OIRA can also “encourage” an agency
to “withdraw” a rule,139 presumably because the review reveals the likelihood that OIRA, on behalf of executive branch reviewers, would not con–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
133 See id. at 82 (discussing example including resubmission of multiple drafts of FDA rule during
review); cf. Emily Hammond Meazell, Deference and Dialogue in Administrative Law, 111 COLUM. L.
REV. 1722, 1722 (2011) (exploring dynamic whereby “courts and agencies carry out a revealing colloquy over the course of successive reviews and remands” during serial litigation).
134 See GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 46 (quoting President Clinton’s OIRA
Administrator testifying that “when two or more agencies are at loggerheads over a regulatory issue, it
may well take more than 90, or even 120, days to obtain needed data and analyses, to conduct the appropriate evaluation, and to arrange for the policy officials in the interested agencies to come to agreement”) (internal quotation marks omitted).
135 See Magill & Vermeule, supra note 2, at 1036–41.
136 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 18–20) (discussing “elevation”).
137 See GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 73–75.
138 See id. at 73.
139 See COPELAND, supra note 15, at 1; Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 9).
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clude on the rule in its present form.140 The costs to the President of these
withdrawals will depend on the stage of the rulemaking process. Before
an agency proposes a rule, it can quietly withdraw the rule before it publishes anything; however, OIRA’s public database notes the simple fact of
withdrawal.141 Thus, at this point, the reversal costs are relatively low.
But after an agency has already publicly proposed a rule, though not yet
finalized it, the agency may unilaterally withdraw it without notice-andcomment; however, the agency will have already made public its contemplated course of action.142 As a result, there will be greater costs to reversing the agency and having it withdraw the rule at this stage, given that the
President will feel more pressure from monitoring groups opposed to this
action.143
Finally, the review can also result in no revisions or changes to the rule
at all. The rule that was submitted to OIRA for review is the same as the
rule upon which OIRA concludes review without change. It has been affirmed. Which reversal instrument the President ultimately chooses, in
turn, will depend on these reviewing costs, his available resources, as well
as how far his preferences diverge from those of the agency.144 If their
preferences are sufficiently close — and the agency has used an instrument
rendering reversal a costly enough proposition — then the President will
affirm the agency’s decision.145 As the preference divergence grows and
the lower the costs of reversal, the President will be more likely to reverse
the agency.146 At some point, however, the preference divergence can be
so great that the President will reverse the agency’s decision even if the
cost required to do so is significant.
II. AGENCY SELF-INSULATION
A. Self-Insulation Mechanisms
Faced with these reversal prospects, agencies as the first movers can
choose from an array of regulatory instruments, each with different expected effects on presidential review. An agency will, in turn, be more
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
See O’Connell, supra note 21, at 477–79.
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TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 30 fig.4 (illustrating OIRA review process including the possibility
of withdrawal for draft proposed rules).
142 See O’Connell, supra note 21, at 477.
143 See, e.g., Kevin Bogardus, Labor Unions Uneasy as OSHA Withdraws Proposed Rules, THE
HILL (Jan. 30, 2011, 6:14 PM), http://thehill.com/business-a-lobbying/141121-labor-uneasy-as-oshawithdraws-proposed-rules.
144 Cf. Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 355–56 (providing a more formal analysis of these dynamics
in the context of court-agency interaction).
145 See id. at 356.
146 See id.
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likely to use those instruments that will insulate its decisions from review
the more it expects presidential preferences to diverge from its own, all
else being equal. The agency’s equilibrium choice, then, will depend on
its decision costs and the points at which it expects to avoid reversal,147
background conditions for this section’s closer examination of the various
ways in which agencies can attempt to raise the costs of review and ultimately reversal.148 These self-insulation mechanisms are the institutional
means through which agencies can render the process more resourceintensive, thereby increasing the probability of insulation. These mechanisms can be classified in terms of their functional effects: to bypass review, to decrease scrutiny, to truncate the amount of time available, or to
facilitate successful internal coalitions. They will each require their own
respective decision costs,149 but they share the ability to help minimize the
probability of reversal.
1. Bypass. — Presidential review currently covers “regulatory action[s]” that are “significant.”150 Regulatory actions, in turn, include “any
substantive action” that “promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation, including notices of inquiry, advance
notices of proposed rulemaking, and notices of proposed rulemaking.”151
These provisions define the scope of regulatory review. Any scopedefining provision of an institutionalized review process, however, begets
incentives for agencies to employ instruments that attempt to bypass the
costly process entirely, and thus avoid the risk of reversal altogether.
These instruments include:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
147 These points would depend on the President’s expected instruments and policy choices. Cf. id. at
371–73 (discussing equilibrium instruments and policy outcomes in the context of judicial review).
148 In other words, it examines the costs of the review process that will necessarily precede each of
the President’s potential reversal instruments.
149 Bypass strategies may require higher decision costs relative to non-bypass strategies since they
are largely efforts by agencies to switch to policymaking forms that are not or will not lead to legislative rulemakings. Assuming that rules can induce greater policy changes relative to case-by-case adjudication or nonbinding guidance documents, bypass efforts are more internally costly (though an agency may trade these off for their effects on presidential review). Cf. Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at
360–61. Decreasing scrutiny, in turn, yields lower decision costs, because this strategy usually requires
less of an investment in the substance and form of cost-benefit analysis. The decision costs of timing
strategies are harder to asses, though there is likely an internal cost to submitting a rule late given the
need for more justification that must be provided to OIRA. Finally, coalition-building efforts are more
costly for the agency, and thus will likely be undertaken for rules with greater policy impacts or of
more importance to the agency. Each of these considerations may help to explain when agencies will
choose among various self-insulation mechanisms; though this inter-instrumental choice is not considered in depth here, it may be an extension worthy of future exploration.
150 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993).
151 Id. § 3(e). Such rules include any “agency statement of general applicability and future effect,
which the agency intends to have the force and effect of law, that is designed to implement, interpret, or
prescribe law or policy or to describe the procedure or practice requirements of an agency.” Id. § 3(d).
This category does not include formal rulemaking, rules related to military and foreign affairs, among
other enumerated exceptions. Id. § 3(d)(1)-(4).
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(a) Inaction. — As stated, Executive Order 12,866 requires agencies to
submit “significant regulatory actions” to OIRA for presidential review.152
If an agency does not affirmatively engage in regulatory action, this decision does not undergo presidential review. According to a Congressional
Research Service report, “some agencies have indicated that they do not
even propose certain regulatory provisions because they believe that OIRA
would find them objectionable.”153 An agency may choose not to act because of its own internal resource constraints or because of the threat of
presidential review. While the empirical outcome is the same — no new
regulatory action — the distinction is still important to keep in mind as an
analytic matter.
Relative to the status quo, there are no affirmative impacts of agency
inaction (by definition). However, as others have noted, agency inaction
can nonetheless have important consequences — for example, the failure
to regulate a pollutant can have adverse impacts on public health — a decision which is not currently subject to presidential review.154 While the
consequences of agency inaction can indeed be significant, the decision
facing the agency in the present analysis is whether to depart from the status quo. Relative to this baseline, a decision not to depart, not to act, can
be understood as yielding no new, marginal impacts on the state of the
world.
(b) Adjudication and Guidance Documents. — Agencies can also bypass presidential review by choosing an instrument other than “any substantive action” that “promulgates or is expected to lead to the promulgation of a final rule or regulation.”155 One such instrument is that of
adjudication. This category of agency action could include benefits determinations and licensing proceedings, among other actions.156 Because adjudication proceeds on a case-by-case basis relative to rulemaking, each
one’s policy impacts are limited and aggregate policy change is developed
only incrementally. As a result, there is relatively little information to review and, in any case, adjudication decisions are not subject to the presidential review process. Case studies of particular agencies — such as the
National Highway Traffic and Safety Administration (NHTSA), which
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Id. § 6(a)(3)(B).
COPELAND, supra note 15, at 18.
See, e.g., RICHARD L. REVESZ & MICHAEL A. LIVERMORE, RETAKING RATIONALITY 155–56
(2008); Michael A. Livermore, Cause or Cure? Cost-Benefit Analysis and Regulatory Gridlock, 17
N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J. 107, 118–19 (2008).
155 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1994). This category does not include formal
rulemaking or rules related to military and foreign affairs, among other enumerated exceptions. See id.
§ 3(d)(1)–(4).
156 Magill, supra note 3, at 1386; see also 5 U.S.C. § 551(6) (2006) (defining “order” as “the whole
or a part of a final disposition, whether affirmative, negative, injunctive, or declaratory in form, of an
agency in a matter other than rule making but including licensing”); id. § 551(7) (defining “adjudication” as an “agency process for the formulation of an order”).
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shifted from rulemaking to adjudication in the mid-1970s due in part to
changes in presidential administrations — lend support to this dynamic.157
As permitted by statute, courts have consistently allowed agencies to
choose between these policymaking forms.158
Alternatively, an agency could issue a guidance document.159 Guidance documents are interpretive rules and statements of policy intended to
clarify existing regulatory requirements, though they have often been criticized as creating new obligations upon private parties without the traditional requirements imposed on legislative rulemaking.160 Guidance documents are exempt from the Administrative Procedure Act’s notice-andcomment requirements and thus less internally costly for the agency relative to rulemaking.161 In terms of their impacts, an agency can sometimes
obtain voluntary compliance proportionate to its “gatekeeping” power over
private parties, or else because savvy regulatory targets foresee forthcoming policy shifts.162 However, as a practical matter, guidance documents
are not legally binding, and are thus likely to be less effective relative to
rulemaking in bringing about the desired behavioral changes.163
“Significant” guidance documents, defined under a multifactor test including expected economic impacts and policy novelty, are currently subject to presidential review.164 They garnered much attention in January
2007, when President George W. Bush amended President Clinton’s executive order to formally subject such guidance documents to review, though
the amendments have since been revoked.165 Around the time the order
was amended, OMB also released its Final Bulletin for Agency Good
Guidance Practices, which directed agencies to implement procedures for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
157 See JERRY L. MASHAW & DAVID L. HARFST, THE STRUGGLE FOR AUTO SAFETY 10–11
(1990) (describing NHTSA’s “retreat[]” from rulemaking to “case-by-case adjudication,” id. at 11).
Professors Jerry Mashaw and David Harfst also observe that while such retreats “have been responsive
to general political shifts in regulatory zeal,” they are not only retreats “from regulation,” but “to regulation in a different form.” Id. at 14 (citing also the example of the Consumer Product Safety Commission as an agency that “turned from standard setting to recalls”).
158 See, e.g., NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co., 416 U.S. 267 (1974); Sec. & Exch. Comm’n. v. Chenery
Corp., 332 U.S. 194 (1947); see also Magill, supra note 3, at 1385 (describing courts’ largely “handsoff” reaction to agencies’ choice of policymaking form).
159 Note, of course, that guidance documents that initiate a process culminating in rulemaking would
be covered under presidential review. See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 15).
160 See Robert A. Anthony, Interpretive Rules, Policy Statements, Guidances, Manuals, and the Like
— Should Federal Agencies Use Them to Bind the Public?, 41 DUKE L.J. 1311, 1332–55 (1992).
161 See 5 U.S.C. § 553(b) (2006) (exceptions for “interpretive rules” or “general statements of policy”).
162 See Connor N. Raso, Note, Strategic or Sincere? Analyzing Agency Use of Guidance Documents,
119 YALE L.J. 782, 803–04 (2010).
163 Id. at 803.
164 See Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, Dir., Office of Mgmt. & Budget 1 (Mar. 4, 2009), available at http:// www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/memoranda_fy2009/m09-13.pdf.
165 See Exec. Order No. 13,422, 3 C.F.R. 191 (2007); Exec. Order No. 13,258, 3 C.F.R. 204 (2002);
Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2009) (revoking amendments).
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the approval and use of significant guidance documents by appropriate
senior officials, sought to standardize the documents’ elements, and established public access and feedback procedures.166
Before then, presidential review of such documents was at best sporadic, with one former OIRA Administrator, Sally Katzen, testifying that Clinton’s executive order “was written to apply only where agencies undertook
regulatory actions that had the force and effect of law,” and that she had
“never reviewed a guidance document during her tenure in the Clinton
administration.”167 After President Obama revoked the Bush amendments
and returned to the un-amended Clinton executive order,168 however, OMB
Director Peter Orszag issued a memorandum to agencies stating that OIRA
had previously reviewed “significant policy and guidance documents” and
that such documents remained subject to review.169
Relative to rules, however, the review of guidance documents is much
more limited and unsystematic in practice.170 This is partly because guidance documents as a class are not required to undergo formal notice-andcomment procedures, so there are fewer opportunities for fire-alarm oversight by outside monitoring groups regarding each document’s significance, making the agency’s own initial significance determination that
much more critical.171 In addition, guidance documents that are not expected to lead to a final regulation are not required by executive order to
provide a cost-benefit analysis, further limiting the information about their
potential impacts and therefore their potential significance to the President.172 Finally, the sheer number of such documents likely constrains the
amount of time available to review each one.173 To be sure, many agen–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
166 See Paul R. Noe & John D. Graham, Due Process and Management for Guidance Documents, 25
YALE J. ON REG. 103, 103 n.1 (2008); see also Final Bulletin for Agency Good Guidance Practices, 72
Fed. Reg. 3432, 3432–33 (Jan. 25, 2007) [hereinafter Final Bulletin], available at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/memoranda/fy2007/m07-07.pdf.
167 Id. at 105 (emphasis omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
168 See Exec. Order No. 13,497, 3 C.F.R. 218 (2009).
169 Memorandum from Peter R. Orszag, supra note 164, at 1.
170 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy A Structural Perspective, 77
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 27 n.98 (2008) (noting that “OIRA’s analysis of these guidance documents
(even ‘significant’ guidance documents that have an estimated impact of $100 million or more on the
economy) is much more limited than its analysis of regulations”).
171 OMB’s good guidance practices do, however, provide that “[e]ach agency shall maintain on its
Web site . . . a current list of its significant guidance documents in effect” and “shall establish and
clearly advertise on its Web site a means for the public to submit comments electronically on significant
guidance documents . . . .” Final Bulletin, supra note 166, at 3440. For “economically significant”
guidance documents, the bulletin states that agencies “shall” generally provide notice and invite public
comment. Id. Many agencies follow these procedures, but note that they rely upon the agency’s own
assessment of what constitutes a “significant” or “economically significant” guidance document, raising
the same issues as significance determinations for rules. See infra section II.A.1.(c).
172 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(e), 3(e), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1993).
173 See Noe & Graham, supra note 166, at 104 (“Each year, agencies issue on the order of 4000 regulations, and the number of guidance documents is orders of magnitude larger.”) (citations omitted).
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cies will be hesitant to “issue important regulatory documents that have not
been seen by, or (if appropriate) incorporated the perspectives of, senior
officials inside the Administration.”174 But when the question of significance is sufficiently close or ambiguous enough from the agency’s perspective, the perceived costs of review may well outweigh the potential
benefits to the agency.
(c) Non-Significant Rules. — Recall again that Executive Order 12,866
requires agencies to submit “significant” regulatory actions to OIRA for
presidential review.175 If choosing rulemaking as a regulatory instrument,
agencies can thus prevent review by avoiding a determination that the rule
is “significant.” To be significant, a regulatory action must meet at least
one of four sets of flexible criteria: it might raise potential inconsistencies
with other agencies, “materially alter the budgetary impact of” certain programs, invoke “novel legal or policy issues,” or be economically significant.176
Significance determinations rely on agencies to identify such rules “in
the first instance, vetted by OIRA.”177 Because the burden is initially on
the agencies to highlight significant rules, OIRA must rely on them to flag
them as such, or at least give enough information to enable it to make an
independent determination. Rules that an agency does not identify as significant are thus more likely to go unnoticed. Various tools exist to facilitate this determination, but the information they provide is often framed so
generally as to limit the ability for meaningful, external evaluation. For
example, agencies are required by executive order to submit entries semiannually to the Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory
Actions, a compilation of regulatory activities planned during the next

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
174
175
176

Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 15).
See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(B), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645 (1993).
Id. § (3)(f). The text in full states:
‘Significant regulatory action’ means any regulatory action that is likely to result in a rule that
may: (1) Have an annual effect on the economy of $100 million or more or adversely affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public
health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities; (2) Create a serious inconsistency or otherwise interfere with an action taken or planned by another agency; (3) Materially alter the
budgetary impact of entitlements, grants, user fees, or loan programs or the rights and obligations of
recipients thereof; or (4) Raise novel legal or policy issues arising out of legal mandates, the President’s
priorities, or the principles set forth in this Executive order.”
Id. OMB’s Circular A-4 states that “Executive Order 12866 requires agencies to conduct a regulatory analysis for economically significant regulatory actions as defined by Section 3(f)(1).” Circular
A-4, supra note 75, at 1.
177 FEDERAL ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEDURE SOURCEBOOK 223 (William F. Funk et al., 4th ed.
2008); see also Memorandum from Rob Portman to Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies,
and Independent Regulatory Agencies (Apr. 25, 2007) (referring to process for agencies to request “significance determinations”).
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twelve months.178 These entries include, among other things, a short description of the rule, as well as the agency’s priority designations —
roughly, whether the agency believes the action to be non-significant, significant, or economically significant.179 In addition, at specified intervals,
agencies provide OIRA with simple lists of planned regulations indicating
which ones they believe are significant or not.180 Actions that do not appear on either of these are more prone to slip through the cracks.
Moreover, many of the criteria, including the question of novelty, for
significance determinations are “hardly self-defining,”181 and agencies may
have good-faith but nevertheless ill-informed reasons for excluding some
rules and designating them as non-significant. Even if an agency has initially classified a regulatory action as non-significant, the executive order
gives OIRA just ten days to determine otherwise, a narrow window of time
in which to resolve staff-level disagreements and elevate them if necessary.182 In this manner, by choosing a non-significant rulemaking form,
agencies can limit the amount of information for review, as well as make
such review less likely.183
Take, for example, a recent USDA direct final rule (DFR) that would
require all USDA contractors to certify that they, their subcontractors, and
suppliers are “in compliance with all applicable labor laws,” subjecting the
contractor to liability under the False Claims Act if their certification is in–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
178 U.S. Gen. Srvs. Admin., Unified Agenda of Federal Regulatory and Deregulatory Actions,
http://www.gsa.gov/portal/content/101114 (last visited Jan. 23, 2013); see Exec. Order No. 12,866
§ 4(c), 3 C.F.R. at 642 (2011).
179 More specifically, agencies can prioritize the rule as:
(1) “Economically Significant”; (2) “Other Significant” “[t]his category “includes rules that the
agency anticipates will be reviewed under Executive Order 12866 or rules that are a priority of the
agency head”); (3) “Substantive, Non-significant” “a rulemaking that has substantive impacts but is
neither Significant, nor Routine and Frequent, nor Informational/Administrative/Other”); (4) “Routine
and Frequent” “a specific case of a multiple recurring application of a regulatory program in the Code
of Federal Regulations and that does not alter the body of the regulation”; or (5) “Informational/Administrative/Other” “[a] rulemaking that is primarily informational . . . but that the agency places
in the Unified Agenda to inform the public of the activity”).
REGULATORY INFO. SERV. CTR., INTRODUCTION TO THE UNIFIED AGENDA OF FEDERAL
REGULATORY
AND
DEREGULATORY
ACTIONS
(2011),
available
at
http://www.reginfo.gov/public/jsp/eAgenda/StaticContent/201110/Preamble_8888.html.
180 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(A), 3 C.F.R. at 645. Shortly after the implementation of
the Clinton Order, OIRA Administrator Sally Katzen reported that OIRA believed that “so far, the listing system that has been implemented contains both discipline and flexibility. Both OIRA staff and
agency staff have worked to accommodate each other’s needs.” Office of Mgmt. & Budget, Exec. Office of the President, Report on Executive Order No. 12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 59 Fed.
Reg. 24,276, 24,286 (May 10, 1994).
181 Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 14).
182 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 4(c)(3), 3 C.F.R. at 642.
183 A report on the implementation of Clinton’s executive order relayed that the definition of “significance” had been the subject of great discussion and delay. “Some of the disagreements,” the report
hypothesized, “may be attributable to the difference in the natural inclinations of rule writers, who
might prefer not to have another review layer to go through . . . .” Report on Executive Order No.
12866, Regulatory Planning and Review, 59 Fed. Reg. at 24,277 (May 10, 1994).
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correct.184 Direct final rules are promulgated without prior notice and
comment and become effective at some point after publication in the Federal Register unless “adverse” comments are received.185 In this case, the
Federal Register reported that USDA’s DFR was designated as “not significant according to Executive Order 12866 and therefore the rule has not
been reviewed by OMB.”186 Commenters raised numerous objections, including claims that the provisions were too vague or burdensome, and
highly controversial.187 One commenter asserted that “USDA’s handling
of this regulation as a DFR suggests that in seeking OMB’s clearance, the
Department characterized this [as] a minor language change and noncontroversial . . . suggest[ing] that the agency was being disingenuous in its
submission to OMB.”188 The accuracy or inaccuracy of this charge aside,
given the substance of the rule and the resulting reactions, there is certainly a plausible argument that the rule was “significant” as a novel legal or
policy issue, and thus should have been subject to presidential review.
Even if OIRA had this information and disagreed, the example simply illustrates how self-identified non-significant rules can render presidential
review more difficult.
***
To summarize thus far, agencies can choose between simple inaction,
adjudication, guidance documents, or non-significant rules as instruments
that are more likely as a class to bypass presidential review. They vary in
terms of their policy impacts and thus effectiveness. For a resourceconstrained agency, adjudication may be less effective than guidance documents, which are themselves less effective than non-significant rules. At
the same time, each of these instruments may still be attractive to the
agency because they are exempt from review altogether or contain limited
amounts of information to review, thus making them more difficult to reverse. Others have certainly recognized that agencies may strategically
choose less costly instruments, such as guidance documents over rulemaking, but they have done so largely in the context of courts189 or Con–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
184 Agriculture Acquisition Regulation, Labor Law Violations, 76 Fed. Reg. 74722 (to be codified at
48 CFR 422) (Dec. 1, 2011) (direct final rule); 76 Fed. Reg. 74755 (Dec. 1, 2011) (proposed rule).
185 See Michael Kolber, Rulemaking Without Rules An Empirical Study of Direct Final Rulemaking,
72 ALB. L. REV. 79, 81 (2009).
186 76 Fed. Reg. at 74723, 74756.
187 Letter from Chamber of Commerce to Lisa M. Wilusz, Director, Office of Procurement and
Property
Management
14
(Jan.
24,
2012),
available
at
http://www.uschamber.com/sites/default/files/comments/120124usdablistcommentsDFR.pdf.
188 See id. (arguing that rule raised “novel legal and policy issues” and could “adversely affect in a
material way the sector of the economy defined by companies that contract with the USDA” and thus
should have been reviewed by OIRA); Letter from Equal Employment Advisory Council to the Office
of Procurement and Property Management (Jan. 24, 2012), available at http://www.eeac.org/public/12022a.pdf (raising similar concerns).
189 See sources cited supra note 3.
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gress.190 This discussion seeks to bring the President more firmly back into the picture in light of actors’ respective budget constraints.191
2. Scrutiny Calibration. — Even if an agency is unable to bypass review, it can also attempt to calibrate the level of scrutiny the regulatory action receives during the review process. The term “scrutiny” here is a conscious one: just as heightened levels of judicial scrutiny imply that an
appellate judge will afford less deference to the court below, so too in the
context of presidential review. Agencies that successfully lower the scrutiny of review essentially raise the costs of potential reversal, as the President would have to use greater resources to identify and target those regulatory decisions with which he disagrees.
Economically significant rules are more likely than (merely) significant
ones to garner scrutiny because higher cost or benefit rules are more likely
to be politically salient. They are the rules to which the President will pay
the most attention. Public logs also reveal that such rules are more likely
to become the subject of meetings between OIRA staff and nongovernmental parties, suggesting heightened public scrutiny as well.192
Economically significant rules are also required to provide a more rigorous
and transparent cost-benefit analysis.193 As a result, “[t]he level of scrutiny” of presidential review is “strongly influenced by the agency’s informed
and presumptively good-faith initial designation of a regulation
as . . . ‘significant,’ or ‘economically significant.’”194 The more likely an
agency is to designate a rule as economically significant and to provide a
more transparent cost-benefit analysis, the higher the likelihood of presidential scrutiny.
To qualify as economically significant, the main criterion is that a rule
must be expected to result in “an annual effect on the economy of $100
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
190 See, e.g., James T. Hamilton & Christopher H. Schroeder, Strategic Regulators and the Choice of
Rulemaking Procedures The Selection of Formal vs. Informal Rules in Regulating Hazardous Waste,
57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 111, 112–13 (1994). While Hamilton and Schroeder recognize that
“[i]nformality . . . offers a means for regulators to evade both the constraints imposed by Congress and
the courts and the executive branch oversight exercised by OMB,” their discussion continuously emphasizes only the legislature and the judiciary. Id. at 147 (emphasis added). For example, their next sentences provide:
We do not claim that these informal rules go unnoticed by the legislative and judicial branches, just as slack does not go unnoticed in general principal-agent relationships. Rather, courts
and Congress must weigh the costs of monitoring and punishing agencies against the costs
posed by agency discretion embodied in informal rules.
Id. at 147–48.
191 See, e.g., Michael Asimow, Nonlegislative Rulemaking and Regulatory Reform, 1985 DUKE L.J.
381, 404–08 (arguing that agency internal budget constraints influence the choice of guidance documents).
192 See Croley, supra note 36, at 844, 871–72.
193 See Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(a)(3)(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 645–46 (1993).
194 Declaration of Richard B. Belzer at 9, Tafas v. Dudas, No. 178-2 (E.D. Va. Dec. 27, 2007), available at http://www.rbbelzer.com/uploads/7/1/7/4/7174353/tafas_ex-21-belzer-declaration.pdf (describing
experience as career civil service economist at OIRA from November 1988 until September 1998).

AGENCY SELF-INSULATION

35

million or more.”195 This threshold currently applies to the impact of regulatory actions “in any one year and it [also] includes benefits, costs, or
transfers” — that is, “$100 million in annual benefits, or costs, or transfers” would be sufficient, while $50 million in benefits and $49 million in
costs would not be.196 In light of this threshold, accounts sometimes incorrectly state that OIRA staff members conduct cost-benefit analysis
(CBA) in the first instance, as if to suggest that OIRA actually calculates
the expected costs and benefits of a regulation.197 In fact, however, agencies first prepare the analyses and send the supporting documents to OIRA,
which then coordinates a review with various other executive branch entities. This distinction is important because of the incentives that exist for
the agency during the CBA preparation stage — in anticipation of that review.
Cost-benefit analysis means many things to different people,198 yet attempts to provide a coherent theoretical basis199 belie the highly variable
ways in which agencies conduct it in practice. Some agencies prepare
what could be best described as a back-of-the envelope estimation of regulatory impacts200 — a rough accounting of the pros and cons of a rule —
while others undertake (or more commonly, contract out) expensive and
sophisticated efforts to collect data from market-behavior or consumer
willingness-to-pay studies about a rule’s monetized costs and benefits.201
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
195 Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 3(f)(1), 3 C.F.R. at 641. Alternatively, the action could also “adversely
affect in a material way the economy, a sector of the economy, productivity, competition, jobs, the environment, public health or safety, or State, local, or tribal governments or communities . . . .” Id. These
criteria are less relevant to the analysis here, though similar insights would hold. Thus, for the sake of
simplicity, this Article focuses only on the $100 million-dollar threshold.
196 OFFICE OF INFO. & REGULATORY AFFAIRS, REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: FREQUENTLY
ASKED
QUESTIONS
1
(Feb.
7,
2011)
(emphasis
removed),
available
at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/omb/assets/OMB/circulars/a004/a-4_FAQ.pdf.
197 See, e.g., Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 57 (“OIRA staff members are the ones who
actually conduct cost-benefit analyses.”); Scott Harshbarger & Goutam U. Jois, Turning the Page on the
Global Financial Crisis Civic Capitalism and a Blueprint for the Future, 24 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 15,
47 (2010) (“OIRA’s task is essentially to evaluate all proposed regulation that comes out of executive
branch agencies, generally by conducting a cost-benefit analysis of the proposed regulation.”); see also
Stuart Shapiro, OIRA Inside and Out, 63 ADMIN L. REV. 135, 139 (noting that a “common error is assuming that cost-benefit analyses are conducted by OIRA, not the agencies”).
198 See Richard A. Posner, Cost-Benefit Analysis Definition, Justification, and Comment on Conference Papers, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1153, 1153 (2000) (“The term ‘cost-benefit analysis’ has a variety of
meanings and uses.”).
199 See generally ADLER & POSNER, supra note 38, at 9–24; EDITH STOKEY & RICHARD ZECKHAUSER, A PRIMER FOR POLICY ANALYSIS 134–158 (1978).
200 See, e.g., Default Investment Alternatives Under Participant Directed Individual Account Plans,
29 C.F.R. pt. 2550 (2013) (regulatory impact analysis).
201 See, e.g., OFFICE OF AIR QUALITY PLANNING & STANDARDS, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY,
REGULATORY IMPACT ANALYSIS: PROPOSED NEW SOURCE PERFORMANCE STANDARDS AND
AMENDMENTS TO THE NATIONAL EMISSIONS STANDARDS FOR HAZARDOUS AIR POLLUTANTS
FOR
THE
OIL
AND
NATURAL
GAS
INDUSTRY
(2011),
available
at
http://www.epa.gov/ttnecas1/regdata/RIAs/oilnaturalgasfinalria.pdf. See generally Robert W. Hahn et
al., Assessing Regulatory Impact Analyses The Failure of Agencies to Comply with Executive Order
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Agencies also vary in terms of how they discount these effects, the extent
to which they describe costs and benefits qualitatively as opposed to quantitatively, and the number of alternatives they explicitly consider, among
numerous other factors.202
Given such discretion and the wide array of practices, agencies can
attempt to insulate their regulatory decisions through CBA preparation in
multiple ways. First, they can work to avoid the designation of economic
significance altogether and thus decrease the amount of presidential scrutiny. Reports from former OIRA officials, for example, suggest that agencies may avoid determinations of economic significance by splitting rules
into parts — each of which falls beneath the $100 million threshold.203
So, for example, an economically significant rule with an expected impact
of $150 million in a given year could be split into two separate rules, each
of which is expected to cost $75 million in that year. Neither of these
rules would now be designated as economically significant, thus effectively lowering the scrutiny of review. Similarly, agencies could also choose
discount rates that decrease the expected costs or benefits, or place greater
weight on particular cost-benefit studies in the literature which predict
minimal economic impacts, all in attempts to remain under the threshold.
Alternatively, even if efforts to avoid a determination of economic significance are unsuccessful, agencies can make choices regarding the substance and form of a CBA that have self-insulating effects.204 As understood here, the substance of a CBA refers to the strength of the data
supporting the analysis and the conclusions drawn from it, while its form
goes to how an expert agency communicates the results of its analysis to a
more generalist audience. The two dimensions are certainly related, but
they can be isolated. When preparing a CBA, an agency faces separate resource decisions regarding how much to invest in expertise when reaching
its decisions, as well as how to present its CBA at the point of presidential
submission before the rule is publicly released. Stated differently, it can
make distinct choices regarding its own private information and the infor–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
12,866, 23 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 859 (2000) (empirically demonstrating wide variation across
agencies in CBA practices for economically significant rules).
202 See Hahn et al., supra note 200, at 865–77.
203 See DONALD R. ARBUCKLE, OIRA AND PRESIDENTIAL REGULATORY REVIEW 15 (2008) (observing that agency officials often “divided potential major rules into two or more non-major components, and in other cases they might argue that the estimated costs or benefits were under the $100 million threshold”); Declaration of Richard B. Belzer, Ph.D, supra note 194, at 9 (“During my tenure in
OIRA, I often observed agencies attempt to split draft regulations into smaller parts so as to avoid exceeding the $100 million threshold for a ‘major’ or ‘economically significant’ regulation, presumably in
hopes of avoiding the requirements to prepare a Regulatory Impact Analysis.”) see also Note, supra
note 22, at 1002.
204 To the extent that, as argued by Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 30), costs and benefits
may not often be “the key issue” during the review process, many of the claims here would also apply
to the substance and presentation of other issues germane to review.
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mation it presents to presidential reviewers, subject, of course, to any exogenous data limitations.
Regarding the agency’s own investment in research and expertise,205
the more an agency invests in such research, the more costly it becomes
for the President to contest the agency’s decision. Competing expertise
from experts within the executive branch would now be necessary in order
to engage the agency on its terms.206 In other words, the stronger the
technical substance of the CBA, the more resource-intensive the review
process required to engage with and dispute the agency’s findings. Reversal costs are also raised if the President decides, instead, to politicize the
data by exerting pressure on the agency head to alter or suppress the analysis. Not only does this require more political capital by the President, but
it also raises the risk that the agency can informally release (or credibly
threaten to release) its underlying data to oversight bodies that can more
readily check the President. In this manner, an agency can effectively insulate through expertise.207
Even when an agency possesses the internal expertise to justify and arrive at its regulatory decision, however, it still faces a distinct choice as to
how to communicate and present this decision to nonspecialists like the
President — a process of translation from unstated assumptions to clearly
stated ones, from jargon to plain English, from the use of complex appendices to executive summaries, and so on. That is, agencies can choose to
initially submit an economically significant rule accompanied by a poorly
translated CBA, which requires higher reviewing costs, or a welltranslated CBA, which requires less. A well-translated CBA, as defined
here, refers to analysis that adheres to the best practices outlined in recent
executive orders and OIRA guidance documents, which generally promote
principles of clarity, consistency, and analytic rigor.208 In particular,
OMB’s 2003 Circular A-4 provides that, in order to be a “good analysis,”
it must be a “transparent” one that states “what assumptions were used,
such as the time horizon for the analysis and the discount rates applied to
future benefits and costs,” along with “a sensitivity analysis to reveal
whether, and to what extent, the results of the analysis are sensitive to
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
205 For a more detailed and nuanced discussion of this topic, see generally Matthew C. Stephenson,
Bureaucratic Decision Costs and Endogenous Agency Expertise, 23 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 469 (2007);
Stephenson, supra note 61, at 1453–61.
206 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 17–19).
207 Jed Stiglitz, Choice of Policymaking Form Judicial Competence and Agency Obfuscation 8–10
(Oct. 19, 2012) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with author) (exploring notion of insulation through
expertise in the context of an independent agency, the FCC, relative to judicial review).
208 See Robert W. Hahn & Patrick M. Dudley, How Well Does the U.S. Government Do Benefit-Cost
Analysis? 1 REV. OF ENVTL. ECON. & POL’Y. 192, 195–96 (2007) (discussing various methods for
assessing the “quality” of regulatory analyses and concluding that scoring against executive order and
guidance criteria was best method).
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plausible changes in the main assumptions and numeric inputs.”209 A
well-translated CBA generally requires greater investments of agency resources to lucidly present the resulting analysis upon submission to the
President.210
Rules with a well-translated CBA impose lower reviewing costs because they provide a greater amount of readily useable information upon
which to internally debate a policy decision within the executive branch.
More of the review time can be spent discussing the appropriate regulatory
alternatives based on the information gained through CBA, rather than attempting to clarify assumptions or extract data sources from the agency
through costly phone calls, meetings, and so on. Indeed, one important
function of presidential review, as discussed, is analytic: to convert poorly
translated CBAs to well-translated ones, not only to provide better information to the President, but also to other political monitors in anticipation
of the notice-and-comment process. In this manner, agencies can effectively force more of the review to be spent contesting the form rather than
the substance of the CBA and, in doing so, reduce the likelihood that the
decision will be reversed on the merits.211
To illustrate, consider this account from a former OIRA official:
On the first level, we use common sense. If a reasonably intelligent
lay
person is reading through the supporting documentation for the rule, could he
reach the same result? Is there a reasonably clear documentation of the major
effects? If we can’t tell what is going on, we send it back. We look for objectives, alternatives, costs, and benefits.
....
Occasionally, we have the luxury of getting into sophisticated issues, such as
calculating the discount rate and how sensitive the predictions are to the discount rates. Unfortunately, we do not always have time for this.212

In this manner, the extent to which a poorly translated CBA can be improved will be a function of the resources and time (usually ninety days)
available to engage in the iterative process of (1) interagency review; (2)
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
209
210

See Circular A-4, supra note 75.
See ADLER & POSNER, supra note 38, at 80–88 (describing CBA’s average decision costs and
noting that direct costs of an analysis hover around $1-2 million). These can include the “wages for
agency staff involved in the preparation or review of such analyses, the cost of information or computational resources used in analyses, overhead costs, [and the] fees for analyses prepared by independent
contractors.” Id. at 80.
211 Of course, a CBA’s form and substance can be related as in the case when an agency’s failure to
discuss its rationale for choosing a regulatory option (weak form) results in a vulnerable conclusion
(weak substance); however, one can roughly distinguish between how costs and benefits are presented,
and the ultimate outcome chosen based on those costs and benefits.
212 THOMAS O. MCGARITY, REINVENTING RATIONALITY: THE ROLE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS IN THE FEDERAL BUREAUCRACY 273–74 (1991) (quoting a former high-level OIRA official, Mr.
Thomas Hopkins (1983)) (emphasis added). While this account predates Clinton’s executive order,
there is little reason to believe that the same dynamic would not hold afterwards, if not even more so,
given the new 90-day time limit.
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comments, suggestions, and questions arising from that review and sent
back to the agency; (3) further review of the resulting revisions, if any, and
so on. A poorly translated CBA will often result in the rule being sent
back to the agency, often more than once, with questions and comments
designed to clarify and, sometimes, contest the analytic basis.
As a result, agencies will often have an incentive to choose a poorly
translated CBA instead of a well-translated one at the point of presidential
submission (though it may expect to eventually improve the CBA by the
time the review process is complete), since doing so will be more likely to
insulate the rule by increasing review costs. One EPA official, for example, has “candidly” observed that “EPA has written many rules [the way
that it has, partially,] because of a desire . . . to obfuscate in order to get
the rules through the regulatory and [OMB] approval process.”213
At the same time, the net effect of a poorly translated CBA on the
probability of reversal may well be ambiguous if the form of a CBA also
serves as a negative signal for the underlying substance.214 Reviewers
could interpret a confusing CBA as an indication that the substance of the
rule is also poor, thus becoming more likely to reverse it. One might similarly argue that when agencies have rules that are substantively strong on
the merits, they would have a cross-cutting incentive to submit a welltranslated CBA to signal the rule’s strength. Both are compelling possibilities, but note that for reviewers to even reach a conclusion on the merits,
they would still have to spend time and resources engaging with the agency in order to clarify the underlying CBA substance before contesting it.
This epistemic disadvantage results in higher resource costs at the margin
and can thus yield insulating effects.215 Regardless, because of these
cross-cutting potential dynamics, identifying which effects would ultimately dominate is ambiguous in theory and must thus be tested against
available data.216
This concept of poorly translated CBA as a self-insulation mechanism
builds upon the work of others that have considered CBA as a strategic
means of acquiring information about a project’s net value,217 but now
broadens the institutional lens to consider how a CBA’s form can also fa–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
213 Joel A. Mintz, “Neither the Best of Times Nor the Worst of Times” EPA Enforcement During the
Clinton Administration, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,390, 10,395 (2005) (emphasis added) (first alteration in
original).
214 See Matthew C. Stephenson, A Costly Signaling Theory of “Hard Look” Judicial Review, 58
ADMIN. L. REV. 753, 766 (2006).
215 At the same time, agencies with substantively strong rules can still publicly release rules with
well-translated CBA at the conclusion of the review process and would indeed have an incentive to do
so for the sake of monitors and judicial review. Nevertheless, they would still benefit by making a different self-insulating choice at the initial point of presidential submission.
216 See infra Part 0.2 for a discussion of data sources and empirical investigation involving CBA
quality.
217 See, e.g., Posner, supra note 20, at 1154–62; Stephenson, supra note 205, at 471–83.
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cilitate or hinder the review process itself. In doing so, it distinguishes the
more well-known incentives for agencies to augment net benefits in order
to increase a regulatory action’s perceived value, and turns instead to the
ways in which a CBA’s presentation at the point of submission can impose
higher or lower reviewing costs.
3. Timing Strategies. — In addition to choosing regulatory instruments
designed to bypass review and calibrate its scrutiny, agencies can also effectively truncate the time available for review, such that the President will
be able to review and reverse a fewer number of decisions either within or
across rules. Recall that in response to the criticism during previous administrations that “delay was OIRA’s tactic of choice for stifling costly
new regulations,”218 President Clinton’s executive order imposed a ninetyday cap subject to a thirty-day extension on the amount of time available
for review,219 which itself could be extended for “whatever length [the
agency] deems appropriate.”220 While the Clinton Administration appears
not to have enforced the deadlines vigorously, accounts suggest that they
were more strictly enforced beginning with George W. Bush’s OIRA Administrator, who specifically instructed his staff “that no rule will stay
longer than 90 days at OMB without my personal authorization.”221
The best way to understand this initial ninety-day clock is as a timing
default rule: a presumption that review should be complete within that period after which there are increased political costs for extending the review. Those costs can be in the form of greater scrutiny from outside interest groups,222 as well as congressional oversight hearings or letters.223
As a result, agencies can insulate themselves from political control by attempting to truncate the amount of time effectively available for review.
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
218
219
220

Bagley & Revesz, supra note 109, at 1280.
Exec. Order No. 12,866 § 6(b)(2)(B)–(C), 3 C.F.R. 638, 647 (1993)
See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 9–10). Sunstein cites the provision of the order
providing that “[t]he review process may be extended (1) once by no more than 30 calendar days upon
the written approval of the Director and (2) at the request of the agency head” and notes that it “might
be taken to be ambiguous because of the use of the word ‘and.’” Id. at 10 n.37. However, he states
that “it has long been understood that the agency head may request an extension of any length, including an indefinite one.” Id.
221 GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 47. The number of review periods lasting
more than ninety days dropped significantly in the year of this instruction, suggesting that it had noticeable effect. See id. at 46 fig.7.
222 See, e.g., White House Delays Whale Protection Rule, CTR. FOR EFFECTIVE GOV’T (July 24,
2007), http://www.foreffectivegov.org/node/3366 (citing delay and related concerns that “the Bush administration is giving special access to business interests and overemphasizing economic considerations
in its review of the rule”).
223 See, e.g., Letter from Frank R. Lautenberg & Sheldon Whitehouse, Senators, U.S. Senate, to Cass
Sunstein, Adm’r, Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs (Sept. 9, 2011) (asking OIRA Administrator to
conclude review given that EPA’s “proposed rule listing chemicals of concern” was sent to OIRA “nearly 500 days ago and well beyond the 90 days authorized for OIRA review”), available at
http://www.whitehouse.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/LautenbergWhitehouse%20Letter%20to%20Sunstein%20%289-9-11%29.pdf.
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Managing that amount of time reduces the number of issues that can be
raised and resolved during the process and thereby increases the pressure
for reviewers to prioritize issues and ignore others that might have otherwise been subject to reversal.
This dynamic is strongest in the context of rules with judicial and
statutory deadlines, though it applies to other internal administration deadlines, such as announcements or high-profile events as well. Both courts
and Congress can impose deadlines on agency action, including ones to
commence or complete an action by a specified date.224 The Hazardous
and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984,225 for example, contained more
than sixty statutory deadlines for the issuance of specific regulations regarding the land disposal of hazardous waste.226 As another example, the
Defenders of Wildlife and the National Audubon Society sued the Department of Interior’s Fish and Wildlife Service in 2007, alleging the department’s failure to implement an adequate plan governing off-road vehicle
use.227 In April 2008, the plaintiffs agreed to a consent decree, which established a judicial deadline of April 1, 2011, for the final rule.228 While
agencies are able to comply with only a fraction of these deadlines in practice,229 such deadlines can nonetheless be powerful motivations for expedited behavior.
A number of courts, in turn, have held that the presidential review process cannot delay the promulgation of regulations subject to such deadlines.230 In Environmental Defense Fund v. Thomas,231 for example, the
district court noted that “OMB has no authority to use its regulatory review . . . to delay promulgation . . . beyond the date of a statutory deadline.”232 Similarly, the D.C. Circuit found an Occupational Safety and
Health Administration (OSHA) rule to be lawful despite the fact that OMB
still had objections by the time the final rule was issued under a judicial
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
224 See Jacob E. Gersen & Anne Joseph O’Connell, Deadlines in Administrative Law, 156 U. PA. L.
REV. 923, 925 (2008).
225 42 U.S.C. § 6901 (2006).
226 Id.; see also Alden F. Abbott and Gordon L. Brady, The Political Economy of Statutory Deadlines, 10 CATO. J. 703, 704 n.1 (1991).
227 See Special Regulations, Areas of the National Park System, Cape Hatteras National Seashore, 76
Fed. Reg. 39,350, 39,351 (July 6, 2011) (to be codified at 36 C.F.R. pt. 7) (discussing lawsuit and judicial deadline).
228 Id. Numerous other examples of judicial deadlines abound. See, e.g., Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Auchter, 702 F.2d 1150, 1158–59 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (per curiam) (holding that OSHA must
propose a rule by April 15, 1983).
229 See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Response, Presidential Control is Better than the Alternatives, 88 TEX.
L. REV. 113, 117 (2010) (reporting that “the EPA complies with only fifteen to twenty percent of the
statutory provisions that require it to issue legislative rules within statutorily specified time periods”).
230 Indeed, Clinton’s executive order explicitly states that “[n]othing in this order shall be construed
as displacing the agencies’ authority or responsibilities, as authorized by law.” Exec. Order No. 12,866
§ 9, 3 C.F.R. 638, 640 (1993).
231 627 F. Supp. 566 (D.D.C. 1986).
232 Id. at 571.
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deadline.233 As a result, statutory and judicial deadlines potentially “let the
agencies ‘game’ OMB by holding rules and analyses until the last minute”
and, in effect, truncate the amount of available review time.234 In other
words, agencies can wait to submit rules to OIRA less than ninety days before the applicable deadline, thereby insulating various aspects of the rule.
Even in the absence of statutory or judicial deadlines, agencies have
other means with which to reduce effectively the amount of review time
devoted to a given rule. For example, they could submit a number of
lengthy, economically significant rules all at once to the same desk officer,
thereby reducing the amount of time the desk officer can devote to each
rule. Some observers of the presidential review process also describe a
practice involving the addition of provisions to draft rules as bargaining
chips that “would be available” for agencies “to give away” or negotiate
during presidential (or later, judicial) review in order to protect what they
perceive as the most important provisions of a rule.235 If common or
widespread, this practice would allow agencies to spend significant
amounts of time during the review negotiating provisions that distract from
others that are, in reality, more important to them.
4. Coalition-Building. — Even if an agency is unable to bypass review,
calibrate its scrutiny, or truncate the amount of time available, it can also
insulate its decisions by building coalitions with the multiple actors involved in the review process — career civil servants, other executive
branch agencies, or the various entities within the Executive Office of the
President. This overall strategy would amount to increasing the costs of
review and reversal, given that more resources will need to be spent “mediating” the disagreements between more actors, or “elevating” them to increasingly higher levels of decisionmakers.236 Concretely, these resource
costs could include the staff time required to brief relevant policy officials,
as well as the efforts required to plan, schedule, and attend meetings. At
the same time, of course, this strategy would also raise the agency’s own
decision and transaction costs, so will likely be engaged when most valuable.237 Accordingly, this section now relaxes the assumption that the
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
233 See Pub. Citizen Health Research Grp. v. Tyson, 796 F.2d 1479 (D.C. Cir. 1986). See also In re
United Mine Workers of Am. Int’l Union, 190 F.3d 545, 551 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (“[T]he President is
without authority to set aside congressional legislation by executive order, and the 1993 executive order
does not purport to do so.”).
234 James C. Miller III, The Early Days of Reagan Regulatory Relief and Suggestions for OIRA’s
Future, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 93, 99 (2011). See also Arthur Fraas, Observations on OIRA’s Policies and
Procedures, 63 ADMIN. L. REV. 79, 86–87 (2011) (discussing examples of rules that “flowed through
OIRA ‘lickety-split’ quickly” due to judicial or policy-directed deadlines).
235 See Stuart Shapiro, The Role of Procedural Controls in OSHA’s Ergonomics Rulemaking, 67
PUB. ADMIN. REV. 688, 693 (2007).
236 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 18–19).
237 See Jody Freeman & Jim Rossi, Agency Coordination in Shared Regulatory Space, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1131, 1181–83 (2012).
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“President” is a singular entity to give way to a more nuanced consideration of the President and his multiple agents.238
The Executive Office of the President (EOP) manifests the “institutional response” to the President’s need for various monitors to gather information about a vast bureaucracy.239 First established by executive order in
1939, the original Executive Office consisted of the White House Office,
the Office of Management and Budget, the National Resources Planning
Board, the Office of Government Reports and “such office for emergency
management as the President shall determine.”240 The number and nature
of entities within the EOP has evolved over the years, but some of the
most enduring include: the White House Office (containing, for example,
the Domestic Policy Council241 and the National Economic Council242);
the Office of Management and Budget; the Council of Economic Advisors;
the National Security Council; the Council on Environmental Quality; and
the Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, among others.243
(a) Career Staff. — Of these entities, the largest is the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), which consists of a number of offices, including OIRA, several “resource management offices” that evaluate and
review budget requests, and others as well.244 OMB differs from most
other units within the Executive Office of the President in that it has a staff
consisting primarily of career civil servants.245 As such, it can offer assistance and advice to the President from expertise gained through institutional memory and experience. Within OIRA, the Administrator is appointed by the President and Senate-confirmed, and in addition to other
members of its political leadership, there are also about forty to fifty career
staff, as well as a Deputy Administrator, who serves as the senior career
manager.246 Of this already small staff, only about twenty to thirty consistently engage in regulatory review. They include “desk officer[s]” and

–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See Kagan, supra note 36, at 2338–39; Moe & Wilson, supra note 47, at 14.
See HAROLD C. RELYEA, CRS REPORT, THE EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT: AN
HISTORICAL OVERVIEW CRS-1 (2008); MATTHEW J. DICKINSON, BITTER HARVEST: FDR, PRESIDENTIAL POWER AND THE GROWTH OF THE PRESIDENTIAL BRANCH 117 (1997).
240 Exec. Order No. 8248, 3 C.F.R. 576 (1938–1943).
241 See Exec. Order No. 12,859, 3 C.F.R. 628 (1993) (establishing Domestic Policy Council).
242 See Exec. Order No. 12,835, 3 C.F.R. 586 (1993) (establishing National Economic Council).
243 See RELYEA, supra note 239, at CRS-9-CRS-10; Freeman & Rossi, supra note 237, at 1176–78.
For a more complete list of current EOP offices with brief descriptions, see Executive Office of the
President, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/administration/eop (last visited Jan. 16,
2013) (describing EOP components).
244 See Freeman & Rossi, supra note 237, at 1178; The Mission and Structure of the Office of Management and Budget, THE WHITE HOUSE, http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/organization_mission (last
visited Jan. 16, 2013).
245 See TOMKIN, supra note 55, at 3; Arbuckle, supra note 203, at 25.
246 See Arbuckle, supra note 203; Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 7–8).
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their supervisors, “branch chief[s]” who supervise and oversee portfolios
of agencies and substantive policy areas.247
Many desk officers have been at OIRA for many years, though some
depart after only a few. Some of the more senior career staff, including
the branch chiefs, are also veterans of several administrations and thus
possess institutional knowledge and experience.248 The same is true of
the resource management offices with whom OIRA “may work closely.”249
As a result, many of the career staff have developed productive and
longstanding professional relationships with other career staff at the rulemaking agencies. These relationships are likely mutually beneficial for facilitating their repeated transactions and to amicably resolving difficult and
often technical issues.250 Because of these relationships and longer time
horizons, however, there is an incentive for agency career staff to insulate
their decisions by resolving issues at the staff level — with those in OMB
or other agencies involved in the interagency review process — rather than
allowing them to be subject to greater political, and thus more uncertain,
scrutiny.251
The decision whether to elevate an issue to higher-level decisionmakers
will likely depend on the respective staff members’ senses of the political
dynamics and whether their arguments might prevail during the resulting
negotiations. In the words of one OIRA desk officer, “It’s embarrassing to
raise something up and to get knocked down . . . . So people specifically
think about that question, and try to anticipate whether they’re going to get
[political] support or not. And if you don’t think you are, you don’t waste
the person’s time a lot of the times.”252
Because they have been working together for longer periods of time,
agency career staff may prefer to resolve issues with other staff members
they know, and whose viewpoints may thus be more familiar. The threat
of elevation can in this manner serve as a stick. While the potential for
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Arbuckle, supra note 203, at 22.
See West, supra note 60, at 84 (“Although a significant percentage of the desk officers who initially review rules leave after a few years . . . most of the senior civil servants who are the keepers of
OIRA’s professional norms and sense of mission are veterans of several presidencies.”).
249 Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 8).
250 See Id. (manuscript at 10) (“Sometimes, of course, OIRA will have significant suggestions of its
own, stemming in the first instance from OIRA staff, which will convey its views to the agency . . . .
[Changes] are often highly technical or procedural ones, and made without any involvement on the part
of OIRA’s political leadership.”).
251 See MCGARITY, supra note 212, at 280 (reporting that, in the past, “the regulatory analysts in the
Office of Policy Analysis of EPA have used OMB review as an opportunity to wage anew battles that
they lost internally” and that “OMB analysts frequently telephone the lead analysts in EPA for a different view of EPA regulations, and they can use the insights gained from those conversations in OMB’s
future discussions with EPA program office staff and with upper-level decisionmakers”).
252 David Lazer, Regulatory Review Presidential Control Through Selective Communication and
Institutional Conflict 122 (Ctr. for Pub. Leadership Working Paper Series, No. 03-04, 2003), available
at http://hdl.handle.net/1721.1/55802 (reporting on and analyzing interviews with OIRA staff).
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preference divergence between civil servants and political appointees is
well known,253 even when preferences are aligned, agencies still save resources by resolving issues at the staff level. Of course, in situations when
an agency thinks it is more likely to get support from a higher-level decisionmaker, then this incentive is reduced and elevation is preferable, despite the greater resource costs.
(b) White House Offices and Other Executive Agencies. — The literature is rife with misleading references to “OIRA review,” as if to suggest
that OIRA is the only office engaging in the review process.254 But presidential review is not bilateral; rather, it involves multiple actors and reviewers, of which OIRA is but one, though it does serve a central, coordinating function — what Cass Sunstein refers to as that of a “convener” or
“facilitator.”255 After an agency submits a rule for review, “the relevant
OIRA desk officer . . . will generally circulate the rule to a wide range of
offices and departments, both within the Executive Office of the President
and outside of it.”256 The decision regarding which offices should see the
rule will likely depend on a number of factors, including whether the office is perceived to have relevant information and expertise,257 or has otherwise expressed an interest in the rule. These EOP entities often include:
the National Economic Council; the Council of Economic Advisors; the
Office of Science and Technology Policy; the United States Trade Representative; the Council on Environmental Quality; the Domestic Policy
Council; the National Security Council; the White House Counsel; the Office of Management and Budget; the Office of the Vice President; and the
Office of Legislative Affairs.258
In this manner, any number of other agencies and EOP entities, from
only a few to many, could be involved in the review of a rule, depending
on the political visibility and substance of the regulation at stake. As it receives comments and questions back from these reviewers, OIRA staff will
often add their own before transmitting them back to the agency.259 OIRA
then coordinates a process whereby it attempts to help refine and resolve
arising issues through multiple rounds of comments and questions, followed by possible revisions and responses by the agency During this pro–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
253 See, e.g., Clinton et al., supra note 49, at 352 (“[O]ur estimates confirm that the preferences of
career professionals differ from political appointees.”); see generally ROBERT MARANTO, BEYOND A
GOVERNMENT OF STRANGERS (2005).
254 See, e.g., Michael D. Sant’Ambrogio, Agency Delays How a Principal-Agent Approach Can Inform Judicial and Executive Branch Review of Agency Foot-Dragging, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1381,
1424 (2011) (“[T]hrough the OIRA review process, the President has a powerful tool for identifying
and addressing unreasonable delays in agency actions.”).
255 Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 18).
256 Id. at 16; GAO REVIEW & TRANSPARENCY, supra note 67, at 34.
257 Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 16–17) (listing frequent rule recipients).
258 Id. at 17.
259 Id. at 18. For a more detailed overview of the process, see id. at 16–21.
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cess, the more the rulemaking agency has successfully built coalitions with
other commenting entities, the more likely it is to insulate its decisions
from reversal as the issue is discussed or elevated, since the review costs
are now higher (in terms of requiring more meetings, briefings, and coordination among a now greater number of actors).260
To illustrate, consider Lisa Bressman and Michael Vandenbergh’s empirical study relying on interviews with EPA senior political officials.
They report that during the Bush I and Clinton Administrations, “[a]s
many as nineteen White House offices were involved in EPA rulemaking.”261 Often, these White House offices fostered a “climate of internal combat and coalition-building” and “competed for influence over the
content of . . . proposed rules, enlisting other offices, the vice president,
and even the president himself to mediate the disputes.”262 EPA survey
respondents reported that they sometimes turned to other White House offices to bolster opposition to OIRA, and other offices and agencies made
use of OIRA to combat the EPA.263 At other times, OIRA and the EPA
could be allies against other offices and agencies.264 One commentator
noted that “[n]ormal constituency groups” such as the Council on Environmental Quality and the Vice President often took EPA’s side when disagreements arose with other agencies, such as the Department of Energy.265
Should disagreement among reviewers persist, Executive Order
12,866’s conflict-resolution mechanism provides that “disagreements or
conflicts between or among agency heads or between OMB and any agency . . . shall be resolved by the President, or by the Vice President acting at
the request of the President . . . .”266 In practice, however, most disagreements are resolved well before the issue is elevated to the presidential level.267 In this manner, the self-insulating agency can work during the re–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
260 The normative value of self-insulation through coalition-building is ambiguous in that it will depend on the nature of the particular coalition. On the one hand, coalition-building with other informed
and expert entities within the executive branch is likely to be constructive and will result in a betterinformed decision, and thus a stronger rule. On the other hand, if agencies manage to build coalitions
with entities that do not necessarily have better expertise, or that simply have higher status in the decisional EOP hierarchy, then self-insulation in these circumstances is less clear, and may depend on the
nature of the authorizing statute. For a more general discussion of the normative tradeoffs, see Freeman
& Rossi, supra note 237, at 1181–91; see also infra Section III.B.
261 Bressman & Vandenbergh, supra note 30, at 68.
262 Id.
263 Id. at 69.
264 See id.
265 Id. at 68.
266 Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 7, 3 C.F.R. 638, 648 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C. § 601
(2006)..
267 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 19) (stating that “[i]n relatively rare cases, discussion
at the Assistant Secretary level does not resolve the issue”); see also John Spotila, Presidential Oversight: A Panel Discussion with Regulatory “Czars” from Reagan to Bush 14 (Dec. 6, 2006) (transcript
available
at
https://www.law.upenn.edu/institutes/regulation/conferences/OIRAPanelTranscript.pdf) (“During my
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view process to garner support for a policy decision from particular reviewers that might hold sway in the White House. When successful, such
coalition-building efforts will raise the cost of review by increasing the
amount of capital necessary to reverse the agency, as well as the time and
resources necessary to resolve disputes.268
B. Applications
While agencies can choose among regulatory instruments that vary in
terms of their policy impacts and the amount of information available for
review, the question of whether to self-insulate in the first place will itself
depend on a number of factors.269 As presented here, an important factor
is the probability of the potential preference divergence between the agency and the President. That is, holding resources constant, agencies will be
more likely to self-insulate the greater the chance that the President will
have different preferences, thus resulting in likely reversal. By contrast, if
it expects the President to agree with its decisions, then the agency will be
less likely to self-insulate. In technical terms, an agency will be more likely to choose the instrument likely to raise reviewing costs the greater the
distance between the agency and the President’s expected ideal points.270
With these dynamics in mind, this Section now considers some potential applications of the framework developed. Generally speaking, the theory bears on the agency’s choices at the point at which it submits a regulatory action for review, as a function of changes in expected preference
divergence and decision costs.271 Insofar as this discussion marshals the
decidedly-mixed existing evidence, it does so only to illustrate the plausibility of the hypotheses generated. Further empirical work would be nec–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
tenure [as an OIRA Administrator from 1999–2000], in many of the issues that went higher it was really the Chief of Staff that ultimately brokered the decision process — and, to the extent necessary, spoke
to the President about it.”)
268 Cf. Freeman & Rossi, supra note 237, at 1181–1182 (discussing how “costs tend to rise with the
burdensomeness of [review],” especially where “extensive negotiations” and “significant staff time and
resources” are involved).
269 The agency’s decision costs and the President’s choice of reversal instrument will also be relevant; regarding the latter, in practice, return letters are infrequent, and the most common reversals are
likely changes made within rules, or else agency withdrawal.
270 See Tiller & Spiller, supra note 3, at 361; see also Posner, supra note 20, at 1150–58.
271 More specifically, the main dependent variables for agency self-insulation might include counts
of various policymaking forms, scorecard measures of cost-benefit analysis quality, and variations in
rule submission dates relative to statutory and judicial deadlines. Coalition-building efforts may be
more difficult to analyze on a large-scale empirical level, particularly given the lack of access to executive branch deliberations; in this context, in-depth case studies and first-person accounts may prove
more useful to better understanding this dynamic. The main independent variables, in turn, might include party affiliation of the administration, or various policy-preference measures of individual agencies. See, e.g., Joshua D. Clinton & David E. Lewis, Expert Opinion, Agency Characteristics, and
Agency Preferences, 16 POL. ANALYSIS 3 (2008) (proposing method for measuring agency preferences
based on expert surveys and a “multirater item response model to jointly analyze the responses and objective information about agency characteristics”).
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essary to test whether the variations in agency behavior can be explained
systematically by the theory of self-insulation. The modest hope here is to
point in some potentially fruitful directions, as further data become available. Note that such future work, for example, could use the independent
regulatory agencies as a control group, given that they are not subject to
the formal presidential review process.272 It might also consider how to
account for the potentially offsetting effects of greater politicization
through appointments, and other related efforts to counter agency slack.273
1. Midnight Rulemaking. — One scenario in which agencies are better
able to predict presidential preferences, relative to the status quo, is after
the next President has been elected — a situation ripe for “midnight rulemaking.” Midnight rulemaking is the frenetic promulgation of regulations
during the last ninety days of a presidential administration, particularly
when the incoming President is from a different party.274 In these circumstances, executive agencies can expect more preference alignment during
review from the current administration relative to the next one; thus, one
would expect to see less self-insulation in these situations.
Some empirical findings support this prediction. One study, for example, analyzes agency regulatory activity during midnight periods from February 1981 through January 2009.275 First, it finds a statistically significant increase in the total number of economically significant regulations
submitted to OIRA during midnight periods relative to non-midnight periods. Specifically, the monthly average number of economically significant
rules rose by about six, roughly a fifty percent increase from the average
quantity during the entire period.276 Other studies also show that agencies
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
272 See Exec. Order No. 12,866, § 3(b), 3 C.F.R. 638, 641 (1993), reprinted as amended in 5 U.S.C.
§ 601 (2006) (defining “agency” for purposes of presidential review as that provided for in 44 U.S.C.
§ 3502(1), and excluding “independent regulatory agencies” as defined in 44 U.S.C. § 3502(10), both
provisions of the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1995, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3502–3520 (2006)); Exec. Order No.
13,563, § 7(a), 3 C.F.R. 215, 217 (2011).
273 See Moe & Wilson, supra note 47, at 18–19. Note that dynamically speaking, changes in appointments and personnel are often much slower to occur, relative to changes in the various policy decisions contained in rules. For this reason, while specific review efforts and politicization through appointments could be substitutes, they will ultimately be imperfect substitutes such that one would still
expect the self-insulation effect to be observable. Aggregate data also suggest that, since 1980, the
number of political appointees has remained fairly constant as a percentage of federal government appointees, which may further help to mitigate its potential confounding effect. See LEWIS, supra note
48, at 98–100.
274 See O’Connell, supra note 7, at 891–92, 894 n 11; see also Jack M. Beermann, Midnight Rules A
Reform Agenda, MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (forthcoming 2013) (manuscript at 4), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/so13/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2121796 (referring to the phenomenon of “Midnight Rules” as including an increase in “agency rules promulgated in the last 90 days of an administration”).
275 See Patrick A. McLaughlin, The Consequences of Midnight Regulations and Other Surges in
Regulatory Activity, 147 PUB. CHOICE 395, 398 (2011).
276 Id. at 405.
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issue rules with the most “highly visible” costs during midnight periods.277
These results are consistent with the notion that agencies will choose to
submit more economically significant rules over other instruments, such as
non-significant rules, under conditions of expected preference alignment.
That is, agencies will be less likely to self-insulate through instrument
choice as the risks of presidential reversal decrease relative to the next
administration.278 This choice not to self-insulate is likely aided by a
White House eager to release the rules or otherwise “burrow” its policies
before the change in power.279
One would also expect this dynamic to hold with respect to an agency’s choice between significant rules and guidance documents. Since the
current President is perceived as more of an ally compared to the incoming
one, on this view, an agency will shift away from self-insulation as a strategy by choosing rulemaking relative to guidance documents, which are
more difficult to review. One empirical investigation examines the ratio of
the number of guidance documents to the number of legislative rules issued from 1996 to 2006 for five representative agencies: the EPA, the
Food and Drug Administration (FDA), the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), OSHA, and the Internal Revenue Service.280 While a
more precise test of self-insulation would compare the number of
guidance documents to the number of submitted (rather than issued)
rules, 281 this analysis finds that agencies increase the frequency with
which they issue guidance documents relative to rules during the first three
years of a presidential administration, with the ratio decreasing afterwards.282 This finding would be consistent with the self-insulation hy–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
277 See, e.g., Stuart Shapiro & John F. Morrall III, The Triumph of Regulatory Politics Benefit-Cost
Analysis and Political Salience, 6 REG. & GOVERNANCE 189, 198 (2012) (observing that “[n]onmidnight regulations do have higher benefits and lower costs, which supports the point often made, that
administrations wait until the last minute to get out the rules most likely to have potential negative electoral consequences (rules with highly visible costs)”).
278 Of course, in addition to the agency’s supply of rules, one must also take into account the President’s demand for them; during these periods, that is, it is also highly likely that outgoing EOP entities
will be attempting to spur certain kinds of regulatory action in anticipation of their departure. See
Beermann, supra note 274, at 5 (noting argument that midnight rulemaking could reflect an “outgoing
administration” that is “projecting its agenda into the future”). For a discussion of how EOP offices
can “prompt” regulatory actions, see Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 12).
279 See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Agency Burrowing Entrenching Policies and Personnel Before a New President Arrives, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 557 (2003).
280 See Raso, supra note 162. Of course, the FCC, as an independent regulatory agency, is not subject to presidential review — but the data here are presented in the aggregate, and the FCC alone is
unlikely to change the direction of the empirical findings, though future work could separate it out
from the rest of the dataset.
281 The number of rules actually issued by the agency would be an imperfect proxy for agency efforts
to self-insulate, since self-insulation implicates agency behavior at the point of presidential submission.
Counting the number of issued rules, by contrast, would also reflect the President’s decisions about
which rules to allow to be released, though the number could serve as a rough indicator of the agency’s
initial choice between policymaking forms.
282 Id. at 821–22.
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pothesis, since closer and more certain preference alignment with the current administration (relative to the next) would decrease the incentive to
insulate through guidance documents versus rules. At the same time, however, the study’s data are limited and the author concludes that nonstrategic factors, such as the agency’s desire to reduce compliance costs
through greater clarity, may better help to explain the agency’s choice.283
For these reasons, future work should extend this dataset and continue to
build upon these valuable empirical efforts.
2. Variations in Cost-Benefit Analysis Quality. — As expected presidential preferences vary across different administrations, one would also
expect to see variations in the quality and form of submitted cost-benefit
analyses. A simple theory would be that, for a President with an antiregulatory stance, an agency would have a greater incentive to provide a
poorly translated cost-benefit analysis (CBA), since doing so would increase the costs of review, and facilitate self-insulation through obfuscation.284 Conversely, under a pro-regulatory administration, a higher-quality
CBA might become a more attractive instrument, since the probability of
reversal would generally be lower, leading the executive agency to worry
less about presidential review than judicial review (an exogenous factor
which would encourage the submission of better CBAs, as later discussed).285
Shedding possible light upon this prediction, Robert Hahn and Patrick
Dudley’s study scores the cost-benefit analysis quality of seventy-four
economically significant EPA rules published from 1982 to 1999: twentyseven from the Reagan administration, twenty-four from the George H. W.
Bush Administration, and twenty-three from the Clinton Administration.286
More specifically, they examine various indicia of quality such as whether
the analysis includes estimates of monetized costs and benefits and a consideration of alternatives, along with the overall clarity of presentation and
the specification of analytical assumptions.287 While their overall conclusion is that there is “no clear trend in the quality of benefit-cost analysis
across administrations,”288 a look at some of the disaggregated factors may
help to reveal more specific avenues of self-insulation.
For example, Hahn and Dudley examine whether the analyses contain a
point estimate or a range for total expected costs.289 A point estimate is
presented as a single number, while a range estimate includes two points
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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See id. at 802.
See supra Part II.A.3 for a discussion of the complex potential relationship between CBA quality
and reversal probability.
285 For a discussion about judicial review’s potential effects on CBA quality, see infra Part II.C.
286 See Hahn & Dudley, supra note 208, at 197.
287 Id. at 198, 204–05.
288 Id. at 206.
289 See id. at 199.
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bounding a significant portion of the confidence interval. Both sets of data
give political principals important information about key components of
the expected impacts of a regulation.290 The authors find that, under the
Reagan Administration, 15 percent of the cost-benefit analyses provided
neither a point estimate nor a range for total costs.291 This figure was 17
percent during the Bush Administration, dropping down to 4 percent under
President Clinton.292 In other words, during Republican administrations,
the EPA was more likely to provide a CBA that contained less useful information about costs than during a Democratic administration. Given that
the traditionally pro-regulatory EPA’s preferences were likely to diverge
from those of the more anti-regulatory Republican Presidents, one hypothesis is that the EPA was more likely to engage in self-insulation by decreasing CBA quality. Conversely, when there was more expected preference alignment under President Clinton, this self-insulating behavior was
less likely to occur, resulting in higher-quality CBAs.293
In a more recent paper, Stuart Shapiro and John Morrall examine a database of 109 economically significant rules issued between 2000 and
2009. They construct a six-point quality index for the accompanying CBA
based on a number of factors related to the analyses’ “thoroughness.”294
Upon comparing the quality scores with the net benefits of the rules, they
observe that “rules that most barely clear the net benefit threshold had the
least useful analyses supporting them.”295 Shapiro and Morrall hypothesize that one explanation for this result could be that “for rules that are
close to this threshold, agencies may be under pressure to make sure the
analysis shows positive net benefits. This pressure may result in a less
thorough” analysis.296 In other words, “having low net benefits leads to
analysis that omits critical factors.”297 Assuming that Presidents would be
more likely to reject rules with small relative to large net benefits, this
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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Of course, this hypothesis should not be overstated; there are other possible explanations
such as an agency’s greater experience with, and thus improvement in, preparing cost-benfit
analyses. The study also finds that point estimates of total costs were more common than ranges during the Reagan and Clinton administrations. By contrast, point estimates were just as common as ranges during the Bush administration, while few analyses provided both a point estimate and range during
any administration. Id. While the usefulness of point estimates versus ranges is likely to vary depending on the issue, underlying uncertainties, and the magnitude of the range, these findings suggest that,
at a minimum, further research in this area could be valuable.
294 See Shapiro & Morrall, supra note 277, at 195–96.
295 Id. at 197.
296 Id. at 197–98.
297 Id. at 198. The authors call this notion “problematic” because one of their hypotheses is that
CBA quality “may generate regulations that produce greater net benefits.” Id. at 190. The theory of
self-insulation, however, provides a contrary account.
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finding would be consistent with the notion that agencies attempt to selfinsulate by decreasing the quality of CBAs for rules with low net benefits.
However, Shapiro and Morrall also find that average CBA quality was
greater for rules with negative net benefits than rules with positive net
benefits below $1 billion.298 This finding would not support the selfinsulation hypothesis since agencies would presumably seek to shield those
rules. More research would thus be necessary to determine whether other
explanatory factors, such as exogenous statutory constraints299 or a higher
likelihood of litigation for negative net-benefit rules, may have created a
cross-cutting incentive to improve CBA quality in anticipation of judicial
review.300 If not, then this finding would counsel in favor of rejecting the
self-insulation theory, or at least concluding that it is not the dominant effect.
Note that one difficulty with this line of research in general is that
simply scoring an agency’s published CBA would not allow one to disentangle how much of its quality reflects agency self-insulation at the point
of submission, and how much of it reflects presidential reviewers’ differential efforts to spend resources in an attempt to improve its quality. In other
words, while agency self-insulation refers to the supply of CBA, there may
be important countervailing considerations on the demand side as well,
which will be reflected in the eventually published analysis.301 To illustrate, consider another recent study, which scores the CBA of economically
significant regulations in 2008, 2009, and 2010. The authors find, among
other things, that “conservative agencies” had higher-quality CBAs under
the Obama Administration, while more “liberal agencies” exhibited the
same tendency under Bush.302
While the paper uses only three years of data, thus limiting the generality of its conclusions, these findings on their face contradict the notion that
self-insulation by itself explains the relevant variation, since one would
expect exactly the opposite dynamic. The authors explain their results by
reference to the differential demands likely during presidential review. In
their words:
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
298 See id. at 197 tbl 2. More specifically, they find that rules with negative net benefits had an average quality score of 3.95 out of a possible 6; those with net benefits between $0 and $100 million had a
score of 3.03; rules with net benefits between $100 million and $1 billion had a score of 3.79; finally,
rules with net benefits over $1 billion had an average score of 4.04. Id.
299 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 26 & n.89) (citing the “‘positive train control’ rule,
which requires certain technology to be placed on trains” and explaining that “even if the rule does not
have net benefits . . . agencies may have plausible explanations,” such as that “the law requires them to
proceed even if the monetized benefits are lower than the monetized costs”).
300 See infra Part II.C, and accompanying notes.
301 See Acs & Cameron, supra note 24, at 22–28.
302 See Jerry Ellig, Patrick A. McLaughlin & John F. Morrall III, Continuity, Change, and Priorities
The Quality and Use of Regulatory Analysis Across US Administrations, REG. & GOVERNANCE 1, 14
(2012), available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1748-5991.2012.01149.x/abstract.
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This pattern is consistent with the hypothesis that an administration
demands less thorough analysis from agencies whose underlying policy
views are more congruent with the administration’s. Conversely, an
agency whose policy preferences differ from the administration’s must
produce better analysis to get its regulations through.303
This dynamic is indeed a critical one, though it is important to remember
that agencies often have more control over CBA quality as the first-mover,
nor the limited time and resources available for review.
In any case, because of these potential demand-side dynamics, the best
measure for testing the self-insulation theory would be the CBA quality
when the analyses were submitted to OIRA, as opposed to after they had
undergone presidential review and been published. This evaluation would
be possible if agencies released their submission drafts or specified the
changes made as a result of presidential review, as required by current executive orders; however, this is not frequently done as a matter of practice.304 Confronted with this paucity of data, it could be a plausible assumption — assuming resources were relatively fixed throughout the
relevant period — that the substance of the review remained fairly systematic, and that the overall quality of the published CBA could thus serve as
a rough proxy for agency effort. But this assumption may ultimately prove
heroic, perhaps counseling for changes in agency disclosure practices.
3. Strategic Timing. — Finally, as expected presidential preferences
vary across different administrations, one would also expect to see variations in the degree to which agencies exploit statutory or judicial deadlines
in attempts to truncate the amount of review time. Specifically, as agencies expect a greater probability of reversal, they would be more likely to
submit rules closer to external deadlines, effectively allowing less review
time than the default ninety days provided by executive order. Recent empirical work provides some support for these predicted dynamics. One
such study, for instance, examines all economically significant regulations
proposed in 2008 and finds that statutory deadlines led to considerably
shorter presidential review times.305 The magnitude of diminished review
was substantial, ranging from thirty-eight percent to ninety percent less review time.306 In line with these findings, the paper also reports that statutory deadlines result in lower quality CBA as well. After scoring such
analyses, the authors find that regulations with statutory deadlines had a
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mean quality value of 22.1 points versus 27.3 points for the entire sample.307
On the one hand, these findings suggest that agencies faced with statutory deadlines are likely to allow less time for review based on when they
submit their rules to OIRA. They also suggest that the quality of the costbenefit analysis suffers as a result. Even if the deadline extends beyond
the review window, it reduces the threat that OIRA could return the regulation because the agency is legislatively or judicially mandated to issue it.
In this manner, “statutory deadlines could undermine the prospects for effective OIRA review.”308 On the other hand, a competing explanation
could be that agencies operating under tight deadlines are working as fast
as possible and submit their rules without allowing the full ninety days for
review out of necessity, rather than strategically. The answer is ultimately
an empirical question with the expected incentive to self-insulate becoming
greater as the prospect of preference divergence becomes more likely.309
C. Mitigating Factors
Agency self-insulation consists of agencies’ strategic choices amidst resource constraints to raise reviewing costs in the face of expected preference divergence. Identifying and exploring this phenomenon has been the
main task of this Article. To provide a more complete account, however,
this section now considers some potential mitigating factors, that is, some
dynamics that may cut against the observable effects of self-insulation.310
In other words, what other variables are likely to influence agency behavior that may reduce the incentive to self-insulate?
First, while the review process itself is costly and threatens costly reversals, agencies may also perceive benefits to it that will decrease their
insulation incentive. Such benefits could include obtaining greater information and expertise from other executive branch entities311 as well as political support from a White House eager to “showcase and advance presidential policies.”312 Indeed, one way to think about presidential review is
as a kind of ninety-day executive branch notice-and-comment process. As
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Gersen & O’Connell, supra note 224, at 968.
One way to evaluate these rival explanations, for example, would be to examine when the statutes with deadlines were passed (thus giving the agency notice of the deadlines), how long the statute
then granted the agency to act, and what proportion of this time period was allowed for presidential
review before the deadline, based on the agency’s submission. The higher the proportion of review
time to the amount of time the agency had to prepare the rule, the higher the likelihood of strategic behavior.
310 These factors could appear in the error term of models exploring the relationship between the
variables identified here. See Damien Fennell, The Error Term and its Interpretation in Structural
Models in Econometrics, in CAUSALITY IN THE SCIENCES 361 (Phyllis McKay Illari et al. eds., 2011).
311 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 3–4).
312 Kagan, supra note 36, at 2248.
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previously discussed, once an agency submits a draft rule to OIRA, the
OIRA desk officer then circulates the draft to other agencies and White
House offices that she perceives may have a stake in or expertise related to
the rule. OIRA then compiles the comments that it receives from these reviewers for the agency’s consideration and response. The agency’s response is then sent back to the reviewers and after several rounds (or however many rounds time allows for) the issues are slowly resolved and
whittled down through calls, memos, or meetings.
In this sense, the process helps to foster an “interagency dialogue” and
to identify those issues potentially worthy of elevation to higher-level officials.313 Accordingly, it can serve as a useful information-forcing mechanism for agencies from various executive branch vantage points on a variety of substantive issues; it can also help agencies anticipate the procedural
and legal issues likely to arise during a proposed rule’s notice-andcomment process or in litigation over a final rule.314 The process is also
beneficial to agencies for receiving “cover” for their initiatives and White
House support for dealing with the agencies’ constituencies and critics.
Undergoing review can similarly help agencies consider various political
sensitivities and prepare for reactions from outside groups.315
Furthermore, the review process can also be valuable for improving the
quality of an agency’s CBA either through technical assistance or in helping to consider various alternatives. Indeed, Clinton’s executive order explicitly characterizes OIRA as a “repository of expertise concerning regulatory issues,”316 and charges it with providing “meaningful guidance and
oversight.”317 Numerous judicial developments have likely augmented this
incentive, the most important of which is the D.C. Circuit’s formulation of
“hard look” review, which was eventually adopted by the Supreme Court
in Motor Vehicle Manufacturers’ Ass’n v. State Farm.318 According to the
State Farm Court, “the agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its action including a ‘rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.’”319 Though rulemakings survive hard-look review more often than not,320 courts have
sometimes found agency cost-benefit analyses lacking under the stand–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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ard.321 The judicial development of “cost-benefit default principles” has
only reinforced these dynamics.322 These analyses can be improved and
vetted through a robust presidential-review process, thereby potentially decreasing the incentives for self-insulation — particularly for those rules
that the agency expects to be challenged in court.
A final factor likely to inform the agency’s choice to self-insulate will
be the amount of discretion available under the statute to engage in the
regulatory action in the first place. Rules can result from statutory requirements that impose affirmative duties on agencies to enact a regulation, or they can arise from other sources, such as “issues identified
through external sources (for example, public hearings or petitions from
the regulated community) or internal sources (for example, management
agendas).”323 That is, rules can be required or simply authorized by relevant legislation; they can be non-discretionary or discretionary. Nondiscretionary regulatory actions present situations where the agency’s preferences
will be more closely aligned with those of the President for the simple reason that both actors are constrained by statute. Under these circumstances,
an agency’s incentives to self-insulate will be lower. On the other hand,
discretionary regulations are much more likely to face resistance from the
President if preferences diverge; thus, the incentive to insulate is higher.
III. IMPLICATIONS
A. President
From the President’s perspective, agency self-insulation is disconcerting because many of the strategies, such as preventing significance determinations or obfuscating costs, serve only to exacerbate the information
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321 In the well-known Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201, 1230 (5th Cir. 1991), for example, the Fifth Circuit vacated an EPA rule banning the manufacture and distribution of asbestos
products, citing a deficient cost-benefit analysis. The panel found that EPA had failed to adequately
consider alternatives to its ban, and also expressed “concern[] about some of the methodology employed by the EPA,” including its insufficient attention to discounting, unquantified benefits, and exposure estimates. Id. at 1218–19. The court further characterized EPA’s consideration of the costs of its
proposed regulation as “cavalier” and its consideration of potential negative side effects as “cursory.”
Id. at 1223–24. Some, such as Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit Default Principles, 99 MICH. L. REV.
1651, 1682 (2001), have argued that the court required more than the statute demanded. Nevertheless,
such developments have created a greater incentive for agencies to produce a well-justified rulemaking
record with a high-quality CBA. More recently, the D.C. Circuit has exhibited a greater willingness to
strike down rules based on their CBA. See, e.g., Bus. Roundtable & Chamber of Commerce v. SEC,
647 F.3d 1144 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (striking down a rule based on its cost-benefit analysis, albeit for an
independent agency not currently subject to presidential review).
322 See Sunstein, supra note 321, at 1654 (such principles “(1) allow de minimis exceptions to regulatory requirements; (2) authorize agencies to permit ‘acceptable’ risks, departing from a requirement of
‘absolute’ safety; (3) permit agencies to take account of both costs and feasibility; and (4) allow agencies to balance costs against benefits”).
323 GAO, MONITORING AND TRANSPARENCY, supra note 132, at 12.
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asymmetries that presidential review seeks to mitigate in the first place.
Self-insulation also undermines the potential for robust interagency deliberation about the technical effects of a rule.324 Moreover, instruments to
bypass review can impose consequences that conflict with the presidential
agenda. Instruments to calibrate scrutiny can undermine the public legitimacy of cost-benefit analysis. Timing strategies and coalition-building attempts only exacerbate the potential for adversarial antagonism. Accordingly, this section now briefly turns to the other half of the game, so to
speak, and considers some of the possible presidential responses and strategies to deal with the phenomenon.
Specifically, it will focus as a prescriptive matter on some of the institutional ways that Presidents might attempt to reduce agency selfinsulation, many of which already occur in practice as the need arises.
This perspective continues a broader historical dynamic between the impulses of agency self-insulation and executive branch control. As agencies
have learned to adapt to and manage each new development to serve their
own aims, Presidents have adopted incremental innovations in response —
for example, through efforts to increase the scope of review,325 to bundle
rules together to prevent rule-splitting,326 or to require information earlier
in the review process.327 Executive orders and other forms of oversight
are followed by agency adaptation, which then spurs novel presidential responses, giving way yet again to new executive orders and guidance documents, and so on.
At the same time, note that the President’s interest in minimizing selfinsulation is itself constrained. Even with full information, the President
will not always seek to maximize control at all times and, indeed, may
sometimes find it beneficial not to do so.328 Because the review process is
costly and his resources similarly constrained, the President must be selective about which regulations to review and how much time to spend re–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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326 A former OIRA branch chief, Arthur Fraas, reports that through parts of President Clinton and
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327 Compare Exec. Order No. 12,291, 3 C.F.R. 127 (1981), with Exec. Order No. 12,498, 3 C.F.R.
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328 See Lisa Schultz Bressman & Robert B. Thompson, The Future of Agency Independence, 63
VAND. L. REV. 599, 601 (2010) (noting that the “President does not always have a political interest in
seeking maximum control of regulatory policy”); see also Free Enter. Fund v. Pub. Co. Accounting
Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3169 (2010) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (“As human beings have known
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viewing them.329 His limited interest may arise from a judgment that
spending resources reviewing a particular rule would be wasteful given
clear signals that reversal would be highly unlikely. Or it may be due to a
desire to seek distance from rules that are politically unpopular, but are
nevertheless required by statute. Finally, a credible promise to engage in
limited review can also be a valuable carrot when bargaining over some
policy choice, either for current or future regulatory actions.
1. Minimizing Self-Insulation Incentives. — In situations where agency
slack is undesirable and arises from imperfect information, however, the
President could work to reduce the incentives to self-insulate in the first
place. Because agencies’ incentives to self-insulate increase (1) as their
perceived preferences diverge from the President and (2) as the independent benefits of review decrease, it is useful to think of both situations in
turn.
First, the discussion so far has largely assumed that agencies have
some access to information about presidential reviewers and can thus predict the likelihood of agreement. Indeed, they may rely on a number of
proxies such as party affiliation, campaign promises, as well as their own
informal contacts to predict likely review outcomes. That said, however,
the current structure of presidential review can also encourage a fair
amount of uncertainty until the review process formally begins, particularly for those rules that are not high-profile enough to merit informal discussion.330 Because agencies can spend months or years conducting research
and outreach before drafting a proposed rule, they can sometimes be
caught flat-footed during review, hearing then for the first time concerns
raised by the White House and other agencies.331
Even in cases when their preferences may not actually diverge, uncertainty can increase the incentive for agencies to self-insulate from presidential review. The higher the decision costs, the more costly a possible
reversal, so insulation will increasingly become the safer strategy.332
When insulation occurs under these circumstances, the outcome is inefficient in the sense that both parties may have chosen other outcomes had
full information been available. While mechanisms to increase the amount
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329 For one positive theory and analysis, see Acs & Cameron, supra note 24, at 22–28 (modeling
targeting decision as an auditing game).
330 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 12) (“For relatively less important rules, and those
that do not implicate the interests or concerns of other parts of the government, agencies might engage
in no interagency consultation in advance of the OIRA process.”).
331 See, e.g., Elliott, supra note 94, at 171–74 (discussing hypothetical but realistic EPA Phlogiston
rule and observing that in the 18 months before EPA submitted the draft to OMB, “[t]here had been no
contact between the EPA staff responsible for drafting the rule and the OMB staff responsible for reviewing it,” id. at 173).
332 Conversely, when decision costs are low, agencies may be less likely to self-insulate given the
potential benefits of review.
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of earlier information already exist by executive order, however, they are
not currently used robustly in practice. For example, President Clinton’s
executive order establishes a Regulatory Working Group, consisting of
“representatives of the heads of each agency” with “significant domestic
regulatory responsibility, the Advisors, and the Vice President.”333 Its intended purpose was to “serve as a forum to assist agencies in identifying
and analyzing important regulatory issues” and was directed to meet “at
least quarterly.”334 At least under President George W. Bush, however, the
group was “no longer a functioning entity,”335 and currently meets only
sporadically.
Similarly, the executive order provides for various early planning
mechanisms such as “agencies’ policy meeting[s]” held by the Vice President with the “Advisors and the heads of agencies to seek a common understanding of priorities,” as well as the Unified Regulatory Agenda and
Plan.336 But their practical utility for the purposes of increasing the
amount of available information has been, by all accounts, limited,337 with
one former OIRA Administrator opining that the regulatory agenda “process itself has become more of a paper exercise than an analytical tool.
This is not new; before, during, and after my tenure at OIRA the focus was
on the transactions.”338
Despite their authorization by executive order, what might explain the
decline in the use of such mechanisms that, on their face, could provide a
rich source of information to principals and agencies alike? The analysis
thus far suggests a few answers. The simplest (but perhaps the least interesting) is that agencies lack the resources to devote to front-end planning
and coordination and/or OIRA lacks the resources to enforce them. On
this account, as the resources of agencies decrease, they would have a
greater incentive to self-insulate since their decision costs are now effectively higher. Similarly, as OIRA resources decrease, agencies will be
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more successful in insulating, since OIRA’s reviewing costs have now become effectively higher. Indeed, the trend over the last fifty years has
been a steady increase in regulatory agency resources, alongside a decline
in those of OIRA.339 As a result, OIRA has likely shifted resources towards transactional, back-end regulatory review, and away from other early-stage coordination mechanisms.
Another possibility is that none of these planning mechanisms provides
the fine-grained kind of information necessary to serve as an effective tool
of presidential control given the potential diversity of issues in any single
rule. As a result, the President has seen no reason to enforce and use these
planning mechanisms, exploring instead innovations designed to increase
the amount of review time for specific rules in response to strategic timing,
as well as to enhance the benefits of review (and thus decrease the incentive for self-insulation). In support of this hypothesis is the development
of a practice known as “informal review.”340 Informal review simply
means that agencies share preliminary drafts of rules or cost-benefit analyses informally with OIRA in order to receive early input and feedback;
sometimes this early review can be initiated by a White House policy office.341 According to a 2001 annual OIRA congressional report, “[t]his
practice is useful for agencies since they have the opportunity to educate
OIRA desk officers in a more patient way, before the formal 90-day review
clock at OIRA begins to tick.”342 It is “also useful for OIRA analysts” and
other interagency reviewers “because they have an opportunity to flag serious problems early enough to facilitate correction before the agency’s position is irreversible.”343
In light of this Article’s analysis, one would expect that the rules that
are most attractive to the agency for informal review are those where the
benefits of review — say, due to the need for interagency coordination and
information-sharing, political sensitivities, or a particularly complicated
cost-benefit analysis — are high, the expectations of reversal are lower,
and/or divergent preferences are uncertain but can be narrowed through
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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earlier engagement. One example of such a rule comes from the Clinton
Administration under which the Food and Drug Administration (FDA)
asked to brief OIRA informally on a likely-to-be-economically-significant
proposed seafood safety regulation. As the then-OIRA Administrator recalls the events:
As the meeting went on (and on), the OIRA staff became increasingly
skeptical of the approach being pursued and began suggesting alternative
ways to achieve the FDA’s objectives. The FDA staff left without any
commitments to follow up, but then they did. They worked with the OIRA
staff, and when the final seafood Hazard Analysis Critical Control Point
rule ultimately emerged, it was praised by all the stakeholders and an official at FDA called to read me the headline from an editorial in a newspaper from the Northwest calling it a ‘sensible regulation.’344
Along similar lines, a Congressional Research Service study reports
that informal review is “most common . . . when the rule is extremely
large and requires discussion with not only OMB but also other federal
agencies.”345
Of course, the executive branch cannot informally review each of the
hundreds of significant proposed and final rules submitted to OIRA each
year, but the value of informal review to all parties may be another reason
to suggest the need for Congress to consider increasing OIRA resources.
Alternatively, OIRA might also consider more formally acknowledging and
encouraging informal review for those rules that the agency already knows
will be costly or politically sensitive, something that OIRA seems to have
considered in the past.346
2. Decreasing Preference Divergence. — In addition to reducing uncertainty through earlier engagement, the President can minimize selfinsulation by decreasing known preference divergence before the formal
review process begins. One way to do so is to expand the use of “innovative techniques” that Presidents have used in the past to “impress [their]
own regulatory views on the administrative agencies.”347 While these
tools have often been characterized as mechanisms of control, another way
to conceive of them is as tools to increase certainty about areas of potential
preference alignment. These techniques include the issuance of presidential directives, statements, and memoranda to executive branch agency
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
344 See Katzen, supra note 74, at 107 (citation omitted). The regulation in question was Procedures
for the Safe and Sanitary Processing and Importing of Fish and Fishery Products, 60 Fed. Reg. 65,096
(Dec. 18, 1995) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 123, 1240).
345 COPELAND, supra note 15, at 15.
346 In early 2002, for example, then-OIRA Administrator John Graham said that OIRA was trying “to
create an incentive for agencies to come to us when they know they have something that in the final
analysis is going to be something we’re going to be looking at carefully. And I think that agencies that
wait until the last minute and then come to us — well, in a sense, they’re rolling the dice.” See Rebecca Adams, Regulating the Rule-makers John Graham at OIRA, CQ WEEKLY 520–26 (Feb. 23, 2002).
347 Kagan, supra note 36, at 2290.
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heads, “instructing them to take specified action within the scope of the
discretionary power delegated to them by Congress.”348 These kinds of
directives allow the President to communicate his preferences up front and
to instigate agency actions, rather than merely review them.
In light of agencies’ incentives to self-insulate by avoiding significance
determinations, another mechanism the President could use in response
would be to perform randomized spot checks. As discussed, agencies initially signal such determinations in their regulatory agendas or during listing exercises.349 OIRA could draw a random sample from all rules not
designated as “significant” or “economically significant” for closer review,
and request further information as warranted. These spot checks would
require that the agency provide some initial estimates of the costs and benefits, to the extent feasible, as well as a reasoned explanation of why the
rule does not meet any of the significance criteria.350
To illustrate, take the story of the former OIRA Administrator who first
learned from the pages of the Washington Post about a proposed rule to
require labeling of particular kinds of meat and poultry. From the newspaper account, it was clear that the regulation was likely to have an economic
impact of far greater than $100 million. A dispute ensued, in which OIRA
informed the Department of Agriculture that it could either withdraw the
rule or send a draft for review. The Department promptly chose to send a
draft to OIRA.351 This is an example of what effectively amounted to a
spot check, which have helped to catch the rule before it was proposed, assuming that it had been listed elsewhere.
The likely objection from agencies, however, would be that they have
neither sufficient information to provide to OIRA at the agenda or listing
stage nor the necessary resources to gather it. As such, a more effective,
but also more costly strategy would be for OIRA to invite external spot
checks on the regulatory agenda as a whole and to have a regular process
for reviewing them. OIRA could specifically request that commenters
contest any of the priority designations, and that they provide any available
data pertaining to the potential rule’s impacts. Of course, this effort would
depend on the expansion of OIRA’s already limited resource constraints.
3. Reducing Internal Review Costs. — In the absence of additional resources, another set of presidential strategies would entail effectively re–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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ducing reviewing costs by providing guidance to agencies designed to facilitate review, particularly for non-OIRA presidential reviewers such as
other agencies or White House offices. The issuance in 2003 of Circular
A-4, which “provides . . . guidance to Federal agencies on the development of regulatory analysis,” may be understood in this light.352 So too
for OIRA’s recent issuance of a checklist, primer, and frequently-askedquestions for regulatory impact analysis, effectively a suite of tools to lower reviewing costs.353 Indeed, Cass Sunstein writes that “[a]ll of these
documents are designed to promote simplicity and clarity for agencies and
the public alike . . . .”354 The same intuition would apply to presidential
reviewers as well.
A similar rationale would also hold for OIRA’s recent guidance document stating that “regulatory preambles for lengthy or complex rules (both
proposed and final) should include straightforward executive summaries”
that “separately describe major provisions and policy choices.”355 These
changes, if implemented, would help reduce the amount of time spent during review attempting to clarify various provisions with the agency, thus
allowing more resources to be devoted to resolving any underlying policy
disagreements.
4. Timing Regulation Strategies. — Finally, from the perspective of the
President, strategic timing by agencies changes the cost structure for reviewers, disrupting other procedures and forces that exist to help prioritize
the attention given to a regulation. In other words, “strategic timing is a
form of subterfuge that reduces the otherwise existing forces that calibrate
the extent of monitoring to the importance of the decision.”356 One strategy to mitigate this possibility would be to adopt formally what Professors
Jacob Gersen and Anne O’Connell have called a “coordination rule,” the
purpose of which would be to give agencies and reviewers alike notice
about the need to shift priorities ex ante to the most salient forthcoming
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regulatory actions in order to allow sufficient time for review.357 This type
of coordination device could prescribe, for example, a specific time period
for review, set and agreed upon by both parties in advance — for example,
as soon as the legal or statutory deadline was promulgated.
This strategy could be implemented simply as a matter of practice and
mutual agreement between particular agencies and OIRA. A more formal
adoption may require revision to the existing executive orders, which currently require agencies to notify OIRA of any statutory or judicial deadlines and, “to the extent practicable, schedule rulemaking proceedings so
as to permit sufficient time for OIRA to conduct its review as set forth” in
the order, that is, the 90-day default rule.358 One blunt way to attempt to
better enforce this 90-day coordination rule would be simply to delete the
language, “to the extent practicable.” However, to address the likely and
legitimate agency response that many deadlines do not allow sufficient
time to prepare and submit a rule ninety days before the deadline, a more
realistic strategy may be the tailored one: to mutually adopt an early review period for particular rules during which OIRA could begin to review
parts of the rule as they become available (for example, the agency could
provide the regulatory impact analysis) — a practice that already occurs
under informal review. Some have also suggested a more formal early review process for rules with expected annual benefits or costs of over $1
billion.359 More generally, an agency and OIRA could also agree on other
review period lengths that are fixed ex ante, calibrated either to the perceived importance of the rule, or some proportion of the time granted by
Congress to the agency to promulgate the rule.
B. Courts
In light of the incentives for agency self-insulation and the available
presidential responses for minimizing them, what are some implications of
these dynamics, if any, for the courts? As an initial matter, how one thinks
this question is best answered will likely track what one thinks about the
general merits of presidential control underlying many of the constitutional
and statutory debates about its proper scope.360 If one believes that the
presidential control model has been a valuable, even necessary, development for legitimizing the administrative state, then agency self-insulation is
cause for concern, and courts should act to minimize it. Here, supporters
often cite the President’s electoral accountability and national constituency
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as reasons to check agency over-zealousness and capture.361 Only the
President, they argue, has the bird’s-eye view necessary to coordinate and
harmonize agency efforts; he is also the best situated to respond dynamically to changed circumstances.362
On the other hand, if one believes that presidential review is illegitimate, then self-insulation is cause for celebration, and courts should seek
to encourage it. In this view, that executive branch agencies can fend for
themselves helps to alleviate an otherwise worrisome state of affairs. The
risk of capture, these critics argue, is equally likely for EOP entities and
presidential review is unduly shrouded in secrecy.363 Agencies are more
expert relative to the White House in fulfilling their statutory missions,364
particularly for issues with longer time horizons.365
There is, however, a likely and necessary middle ground between these
two camps at their most extreme, that is, between those who believe that
presidential involvement is always legitimate, even necessary, and those
who believe it is never so except in the narrowest of circumstances. As a
practical matter, Presidents have sought to influence their agency heads
through ad hoc and informal means for centuries, with interventions only
becoming increasingly institutionalized through formal review in the last
three decades.366 Against this backdrop, one relevant question is how and
when such involvement can be made legitimately transparent such that
other institutions like courts and Congress can serve as effective checks,
when necessary.367 To the extent that transparency provides some common
ground, such a position recognizes that presidential review is often con–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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structive and valuable — allowing, say, for greater information-sharing, the
benefit of interagency expertise,368 and oversight to prevent unnecessarily
conflicting policies.369 At other times, however, it may be unambiguously
inappropriate, for example, if a President directs an agency head to conceal
or fabricate scientific data in support of some outcome.
Between these poles are a host of possible interventions, whose legitimacy will depend on their specific nature and the features of the underlying authorizing statutes. Normative determinations about presidential review (and by extension, agency self-insulation from it) must thus
necessarily be case-by-case, evaluated against specific statutory and factual
circumstances. In some situations, under particular administrations, such
interventions will be substantively constructive and beneficial, while in
others, less so. Accordingly, the soundest prescriptions should ask, as an
initial step, how to reveal presidential involvement in order to facilitate individual judgments that are assessed against Congress’ demands.
1. Self-Insulation as an Undue Politicization Signal. — Despite provisions under current executive orders for agencies and OIRA to disclose the
changes made as a result of the presidential review process,370 such disclosures are not regularly made in practice, leading some to suggest more
forceful statutory disclosure requirements.371 Until such changes occur,
courts will have to rely on various second-best signals or heuristics, like
indicia of agency self-insulation, to evaluate the nature of presidential involvement. Thus, for example, when courts observe signs of selfinsulation, such as abrupt shifts in policymaking form, poor-quality CBA,
or truncated presidential review time, then such efforts, taken together,
could reflect signs of resistance or “danger signals” 372 that invite greater
judicial scrutiny under hard look or Chevron’s Step Two reasonableness
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370 Under current executive orders, after a regulatory action has been published in the Federal Register or otherwise issued to the public, agencies are directed to “[m]ake available to the public” information such as the text of the draft regulatory action and the cost-benefit analysis; “[i]dentify for the
public, in a complete, clear, and simple manner, the substantive changes between the draft submitted to
OIRA for review and the action subsequently announced”; and to “[i]dentify for the public those
changes in the regulatory action that were made at the suggestion or recommendation of OIRA.” Exec.
Order No. 12,866, § 6(a)(3)(E), 3 C.F.R. 638, 646 (1993). The orders also direct OIRA, among other
things, to forward all written communications between OIRA and external sources to the agency, to
publicly disclose them, and to eventually “make available to the public all documents exchanged between OIRA and the agency during review.” Id. § 6(b)(4)(D), 3 C.F.R. at 648.
371 See Mendelson, supra note 128, at 1148–54, 1164.
372 Greater Boston Television v. FCC, 444 F.2d 841, 851 (D.C. Cir. 1970) (Leventhal, J.) (arguing that
court should “intervene” under arbitrary-and-capricious review when it “becomes aware, especially from
a combination of danger signals, that the agency has not really taken a ‘hard look’ at the salient problems, and has not genuinely engaged in reasoned decision-making”).

AGENCY SELF-INSULATION

67

review.373 Such signals would, of course, need to be understood within
their broader context, an inquiry that would benefit from future empirical
work as to whether agencies systematically self-insulate and the conditions
under which they are most likely to do so.
Whether agency self-insulation is a salutary or subversive phenomenon,
in turn, will ultimately depend on the particular reason for the agency’s
expected preference divergence with the President, and whether that reason
is sanctioned by statute. For example, in cases that reflect an agency’s efforts to protect from interference technical judgments grounded in a statute
narrowly constraining policy discretion, indicia of self-insulation could
serve as signals of undue politicization meriting greater scrutiny.374 Indeed, familiar administrative law principles provide that agencies can act
only under legislative delegations of authority, must remain within the confines of that authority, and may take into account only those factors set out
by Congress. Under hard-look review, for example, the State Farm Court
provided that agencies must consider “relevant factors” but not those “factors which Congress has not intended it to consider.”375 As for Chevron’s
second step, one way to understand the analogous question is whether stat-
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utory ambiguity on a decisional factor permits an interpretation allowing
consideration of that factor.376
Under either doctrinal inquiry, courts should inquire as to whether the
statute evinces a legislative intent to restrict certain forms of policy discretion of the kind more likely to be elevated to higher-level policy officials during presidential review, including questions of flexibility, timing,
and cost-benefit tradeoffs.377 One way to understand this task would be to
consider which actors within an agency or the executive branch — whether
career staff, experts, White House policy officials, and so on — Congress
would have wanted allocated the decisionmaking power under particular
statutory schemes, and to evaluate the likelihood that those actors were afforded that power, given signals of agency self-insulation.378 When the
relevant statute can be interpreted to narrowly limit as the basis of decisionmaking discretionary factors more likely to be associated with raw
presidential preferences, then self-insulation is more likely to be merited as
agency attempts to protect its relative expertise.379 In this manner, courts
can serve a narrow boundary-enforcing role against the possibility of executive overreach, and indicia of self-insulation would be but signals to alert
the need for this inquiry.380
Conversely, when the underlying statute allows for broad discretionary
factors of the kind likely to be considered during presidential review, then
self-insulation is more likely to be inappropriate, for it now constitutes efforts to unjustifiably avoid the interest-balancing that underlies presidential
accountability. In this manner, courts should first determine the extent to
which the statute at issue attempts to prohibit or allows for discretionary
policy judgments, and then treat agency self-insulation accordingly. While
this analysis is unlikely to admit of bright lines given the diversity of statu–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
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377 See Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 32–33) (describing “significant issues of policy, including the kind that might be ‘elevated’” to involve, for example, discussions of flexibility, delayed
compliance dates, and “public health or safety” goals); see also id. (manuscript at 33–34) (describing
how particular White House offices may be charged with the consideration of “political issues” and the
“President’s overall priorities, goals, agenda, and schedule”).
378 Cf. Magill & Vermeule, supra note 2 (examining how legal doctrines allocate power to various
actors within agencies).
379 This is not to say that self-insulation under such statutes is always warranted, or that such statutes should be understood to preclude presidential review: the review process can yield valuable and
relevant expertise and opportunities for deliberation. Rather, the concern here arises when the determinative influence is not of the expert character called for by a particular statutory scheme, and is therefore undue under that statute. In this manner, the interpretive analysis should focus on the kinds of factors the agencies should consider under the statute, and the likely and legitimate sources of influence
regarding those factors.
380 See Richard H. Pildes, Free Enterprise Fund, Boundary-Enforcing Decisions, and the Unitary
Executive Branch Theory of Government Administration, 6 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y 1
(2010).

AGENCY SELF-INSULATION

69

tory schemes and the potential for overlap between the categories of expert
and political judgments, the analytic distinctions may nevertheless be useful as courts apply them case-by-case. These judgments may well draw
upon familiar tools of statutory construction, the identity of the statutory
delegate, or the structure of the agency at issue,381 but as a general matter,
this functional approach would seek to facilitate separation-of-powers principles within the executive branch.382
To illustrate, consider some statutory provisions which courts have interpreted to prohibit certain policy factors particularly likely to be salient
to the President, such as the consideration of economic costs. For example, the Tennessee Valley Authority Court examined a statute requiring federal agencies “‘to insure that actions authorized, funded, or carried out by
them do not jeopardize the continued existence’ of an endangered species.”383 It held that the provision prohibited flexibility, what it called “fine utilitarian calculations,”384 and thereby halted the completion of a dam
in which millions of dollars had already been invested.385
Similarly, in Whitman v. American Trucking Associations, Inc.,386 the
Court held that a provision requiring air pollution standards to be set at a
level “requisite to protect the public health” with an “adequate margin of
safety,”387 did not allow costs to be taken into account when standardsetting; it therefore rejected a contrary EPA interpretation under Chevron’s
second step.388 Courts would likely reach similar cost-prohibiting conclusions under statutes that call for, say, mandating “practicable” standards
“permitting no discharge of pollutants,”389 or decisions based on the “best
science,” or otherwise specifying more resolutely technical and expertisebased decisional criteria.390
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appear willing to recognize the distinction between executive and independent agencies as a basis for
variations in judicial review. See FCC v. Fox, 556 U.S. 502, 547 (2009) (Breyer & Ginsburg, JJ., dissenting) (noting that the FCC commissioners “have fixed terms of office; they are not directly responsible to the voters; and they enjoy an independence expressly designed to insulate them, to a degree, from
‘the exercise of political oversight’”).
382 Thanks to Professor Robert Post for this suggestion. See also Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers Checking Today’s Most Dangerous Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314 (2006).
383 Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Hill, 437 U.S. 153, 173 (1978) (quoting 16 U.S.C. § 1536 (1976)).
384 Id. at 187.
385 Id. at 174.
386 531 U.S. 457 (2001).
387 Id. at 465 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1)).
388 Id. at 481.
389 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (2006); see also Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1498, 1506
(2009) (suggesting likely interpretation).
390 See Endangered Species Act of 1973, 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531–1544 (2006); see also Watts, supra note
367, at 45–47.
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By contrast, in Entergy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc.,391 the Court held
that a Clean Water Act provision calling for the “best technology available
for minimizing adverse environmental impact” allowed the EPA to balance
costs and benefits.392 Here, the majority read Congress’s silence about the
propriety of considering “cost,” relative to other statutory provisions in the
Act, to mean that the EPA could consider it as a decisional factor, and
therefore upheld the agency action under Chevron’s reasonableness inquiry.393 Read broadly, this approach resonates with a number of D.C.
Circuit cases holding that when Congress is silent with respect to a logically relevant factor under hard look review, then that silence should be read
to permit the agency to consider the factor.394 More narrowly, this presumption operated in the specific context of the text and structure of the
Clean Water Act and was thus an ordinary exercise in statutory interpretation, as opposed to a broader cost-benefit default rule. Courts should continue to examine the extent to which specific statutes allow agencies to
consider particular policy factors, if at all, before assessing self-insulation
signals accordingly.
As for how courts would evaluate agency self-insulation after undertaking such an inquiry, Massachusetts v. EPA395 may help to illustrate. There,
a bare majority held that the EPA had failed to provide an adequate rationale for its denial of a rulemaking petition filed by a number of states
and private plaintiffs to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from new motor vehicles.396 Under Chevron, the interpretive question was whether
Congress intended for carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases to be
“air pollutant[s]” under the statute.397 Finding the text “unambiguous” at
Chevron Step One, the majority held that the EPA indeed possessed the
statutory authority to regulate them.398 More relevantly for our purposes,
the agency’s alternative argument was that even if it did possess the requisite authority, it could still lawfully exercise its discretion by declining to
regulate for policy-related reasons commonly considered during presidential review, such as the executive branch’s desire to coordinate its programs, to avoid a “piecemeal approach” to climate change, as well as to allow the President the necessary flexibility with which to negotiate with
“key developing nations.”399
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129 S. Ct. 1498.
Id. at 1510 (citing 33 U.S.C. § 1326(b) (2006)).
Id. at 1508.
Pierce, supra note 376, at 73–75 (citing, e.g., Allied Local & Reg’l Mfrs. Caucus v. EPA, 215
F.3d 61, 77–78 (D.C. Cir. 2000); Michigan v. EPA, 213 F.3d 663, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2000), in a discussion
of the D.C. Circuit’s jurisprudence on interpreting congressional silence).
395 549 U.S. 497 (2007).
396 See id. at 534–35.
397 Id. at 528.
398 Id. at 529.
399 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533–34.

AGENCY SELF-INSULATION

71

Rejecting these premises, the Court under hard-look review held that
such reasoning was “divorced from the statutory text.”400 Specifically, it
found that while the statute tied such discretion to the EPA’s “judgment,”401 that judgment had to be grounded in whether an air pollutant
“cause[s], or contribute[s] to, air pollution which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or welfare.”402 In other words, the Clean
Air Act cabined the amount of policy discretion available such that the
EPA could decline to take further action only upon a technical, expert determination that greenhouse gases did not contribute to climate change, or
by providing another reasoned explanation as to why it could or would not
exercise this judgment.403 After finding that the EPA had “offered no reasoned explanation for its refusal to decide,” the Court found the EPA’s action to be arbitrary and capricious, and remanded accordingly.404
Shortly after the decision, some argued that the case represented an effort by the Court to privilege expertise over politics, and referred to the
“political, cultural, and legal context” as cues that something was amiss
within the EPA.405 Using the lens of agency self-insulation, one could also
understand the EPA’s petition denial as yet another signal of its attempt to
avoid what it knew would be a costly reversal by the Bush Administration,
which had made its views on climate change clear. By choosing inaction
instead of proceeding with a rule, the EPA was engaging in a form of selfinsulation. Indeed, according to various accounts, the Bush “administration had been altering scientific reports, silencing its own experts, and suppressing scientific information” suggesting “a significant rise in global
temperatures and linking the rise to human activity.”406 Thus, the agency
had every reason to believe that its efforts to initiate a rulemaking would
be rebuffed by the President.
Indeed, these fears of reversal were well-founded, as further borne out
by events following the Court’s decision. After the EPA prepared what
was apparently a proposed rule concluding that greenhouse gases endangered public welfare, reports circulated that “OMB officials [had] told the
EPA that its email containing the document would not be opened,” leading
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400 Id. at 532; see also id. at 534 (holding that EPA action was “arbitrary, capricious, . . . or otherwise not in accordance with law” (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7607(d)(9)(A) (2006))).
401 Id. at 532 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)).
402 Id. at 532–33 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 7521(a)(1) (2006)).
403 While this Article locates the doctrinal inquiry at Chevron Step Two, the Court’s inquiry here
under Step One took a similar form in that it asked whether Congress’s silence (and thus ambiguity)
about policy-related factors allowed for an interpretation that considered them. See id. at 552 (Roberts,
C.J., dissenting); see generally Matthew C. Stephenson & Adrian Vermeule, Chevron Has Only One
Step, 95 VA. L. REV. 597 (2009) (arguing for collapsing the distinction between Chevron steps one and
two).
404 Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 534–35.
405 See Jody Freeman & Adrian Vermeule, Massachusetts v. EPA From Politics to Expertise, 2007
SUP. CT. REV. 51, 61.
406 Id. at 55.
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the EPA to later issue only a weak advance notice of proposed rulemaking
that offered no endangerment conclusion.407 This choice of policymaking
form was arguably another act of self-insulation, an abrupt shift from a
would-be proposed rule to a more tentative advance notice that offered little information.
The document revealed, in an unusually visible manner, the disagreement between the EPA’s political leadership and its career staff about the
ability to regulate greenhouse gases under existing statutory authorities.408
While the advance notice itself discussed all the ways in which the EPA
could successfully do so, it was prefaced by an uncommon statement
signed by the Administrator stating that such efforts would “inevitably result in a very complicated, time-consuming and, likely, convoluted set of
regulations” that would “largely pre-empt or overlay existing programs that
help control greenhouse gas emissions and would be relatively ineffective
at reducing greenhouse gas concentrations given the potentially damaging
effect on jobs and the U.S. economy.”409
Amidst the Bush Administration’s “censorious posture,” the EPA simply sat “on a trove of materials — a proposed endangerment finding, a proposal to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from motor vehicles, a proposed reporting rule for greenhouse gases, [and] a proposal on renewable
fuel standards.”410 After spending considerable resources preparing them,
the EPA had decided that near-certain presidential reversal would be more
costly, and thus chose instead to insulate their rules. In this manner, such
behavior can serve as a set of signals about attempts to resist political influences that are otherwise invisible during other administrative procedures
that begin after a rule has been presidentially-reviewed, such as noticeand-comment.
Of course, not all instances of when an agency, say, chooses a guidance
document rather than a rule, or submits a rule close to a statutory deadline
or with a weak CBA, represent attempts to self-insulate. Sometimes these
patterns of behavior will not in fact be choices at all, but will reflect instead top-down directions from the White House after a rule has been
submitted; but these situations too are informative against statutes that demand regulatory action or a reasoned explanation for failing to undertake
it. Alternatively, the preference divergence could also be the result of industry capture of the agency head, which would need to be evaluated by
reference to the industry in question and the regulating agency.411 Finally,
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Mendelson, supra note 128, at 1153.
See Advance Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Emissions Under the
Clean Air Act, 73 Fed. Reg. 44354 (July 30, 2008).
409 Id. at 44355.
410 Lisa Heinzerling, Climate Change at EPA, 64 FLA. L. REV. 1, 6 (2012).
411 See, e.g., Barkow, supra note 34, at 71 (describing Consumer Product Safety Commission as one
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self-insulation could also be motivated by resource constraints, and divorced from substantive policy judgments. Evaluating why self-insulation
occurs in a particular case will thus necessarily involve a context-specific
and case-by-case inquiry but should, at a minimum, prompt courts to undertake such an inquiry.
2. Monitoring Facilitation. — At the same time, recall that presidential
review serves as both a kind of political review of issues that the President
has judged salient to his agenda as well as a form of analytical review of
the ways in which agencies evaluate costs and benefits, choose among potential alternatives, and consider technical issues, as appropriate.412 While
these dimensions can be interrelated and difficult to disentangle, these categories are nevertheless analytically distinct and can help serve as orienting poles. When agencies attempt to insulate themselves from analytical
review, then another important role for the courts, likely to appeal to both
sides of the presidentialist debate, would be to understand courts as monitoring facilitators.413 This role would see courts as helping to ensure that
external political monitors, such as interest groups or Congress, have the
requisite high-quality information about potential regulatory consequences
in order to facilitate fire-alarm oversight and the resolution of competing
interests through overtly political processes. One way to do so would be
to encourage the availability of information sources external to the presidential review process, that is, cost-benefit figures or substantive data
about regulatory impacts that are neither agency-provided nor presidentially reviewed.
As long as one agrees that agents, such as administrative agencies,
should implement the goals of their principals — the President, Congress,
or society more broadly — the dynamics of self-insulation sure to be the
most troubling are those that mask the effects of agency action.414 Indeed,
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See Shapiro, supra note 82; Sunstein, supra note 27 (manuscript at 30–31).
This Article’s concept of monitoring facilitation bears a close family resemblance to Eric Posner’s “signal refinement theory,” which understands the cost-benefit signal’s value as sorting efficient
projects from inefficient ones. See Posner, supra note 20, at 1191 (“Courts should try to raise the difference between the cost of issuing a plausible cost-benefit analysis of an efficient project and the cost
of issuing a plausible cost-benefit analysis of an inefficient project.”). The same is true of Matthew
Stephenson’s notion of “costly signaling” under “hard look review” which posits that the “quality of the
agency’s defense of its regulatory decision provides a signal of the benefits the agency expects to receive if the court upholds the regulation.” See Stephenson, supra note 214, at 766. The monitoring
facilitation role differs from these conceptions insofar as it sees the purpose of increasing information
quality not as a means for evaluating the efficiency or agency net benefits of a project, but rather as a
way to increase information about a regulation’s perceived consequences (whether in quantitative or
qualitative terms) in order to allow for more robust political contestation about them. Stated differently,
this view does not see courts as attempting to facilitate the use of cost-benefit analysis as a decision
rule, but rather as a means of helping to ensure that external political monitors, such as interest groups
or Congress, have the requisite high-quality information about potential regulatory consequences to
facilitate the resolution of competing interests through overtly political processes.
414 The various ways that courts have policed agencies’ strategic use of adjudication or guidance
documents over rulemaking in efforts to “achieve [their] goal[s] only (or mainly) because of the form
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this Article has proposed a conception of agencies that choose regulatory
instruments as distinct bundles of characteristics, some of which make
presidential review more difficult by limiting the amount and quality of information about potential impacts (such as the avoidance of rulemaking or
the manipulation of significance determinations and cost-benefit analyses),
and some of which simply raise the resource and political costs of presidential reversal (for example, through timing strategies or coalition building with career staff or other executive branch entities).
At root, they succeed by blunting the signals that principals ordinarily
rely upon to assess an action’s potential salience to their agendas and priorities. For example, when agencies flag regulatory actions as nonsignificant, significant, or economically significant, these significance determinations should indicate the action’s potential priority for the President. Agency assessments of costs and benefits serve a similar function by
identifying potential regulatory consequences that may be salient to various groups or constituencies. This is true whether they are fully quantified
or described qualitatively. In this manner, attempts at strategic selfinsulation are, for the most part, efforts to reduce information-quality.415
Accordingly, doctrinal developments post-Chevron granting more deference when agencies engage in notice-and-comment rulemaking should be
understood as constructive efforts to encourage external sources of information for the rulemaking record. In United States v. Mead Corp., for example, the Court considered whether to grant Chevron deference to a tariff
classification ruling by the U.S. Customs Service. It held that the ruling
was not eligible for such deference because Chevron applies when Congress has delegated authority “to make rules carrying the force of law,”
and the agency has acted pursuant to that authority when interpreting the
statute.416 The Court noted that when Congress provides for a “relatively
formal administrative procedure” that fosters “fairness and deliberation,”
such as notice-and-comment rulemaking or formal adjudication, it is reasonable to presume such legislative intent.417 In the absence of such information-forcing processes, Barnhart v. Walton418 later provided that deference is potentially due only when, for example, more Skidmore-like
–––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––––
[they] chose,” Magill, supra note 3, at 1446, have been adequately and ably discussed elsewhere, see
id. at 1437–42. To summarize Elizabeth Magill’s analysis, courts can calibrate their standards of review or otherwise adjudge guidance documents and other agency action as ripe for review, all in attempts to police agencies’ choices of form when they offend the courts’ notions of procedural fairness
or sound policy development. Id. at 1438.
415 Of course, this premise should not be overstated; there are many other reasons, besides conveying
information about consequences, that justify agency behavior such as the choice of form. Agencies
often choose to pursue adjudication over rulemaking, for example, when they are uncertain about which
policy to pursue, see id. at 1396–97, or Congress may have dictated the form of regulatory instrument
for agencies to use or otherwise minimized the discretion available for agency action.
416 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).
417 See id. at 230.
418 535 U.S. 212 (2002).
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considerations of agency expertise are apparent.419 By giving agencies an
incentive to garner information from the public or through adversarial procedures, courts have helped to ameliorate the effects of strategic information provision under presidential review by soliciting data from independent sources.
Similarly, when the quality of an agency’s cost-benefit analysis is poor
as a result of an attempt to reduce the scrutiny of presidential review, a
harder look under arbitrary-and-capricious review may be judicially appropriate since there was less initial information for public comment or oversight. Moreover, courts could examine not only the agency’s proffered responses to public input, but also examine as one factor the source of the
comments, taking favorable notice when those sources are pluralistic or
from more neutral, expert bodies such as the National Academy of Sciences. Giving weight to such factors is more likely to increase the accuracy
of the information through robust contestation.
Of course, courts cannot require agencies to undertake any additional
procedures other than those required by statute.420 Rather, here, they
would simply give agencies an incentive to invite external evaluations of
their own work. Illustrative of this approach, for example, are some courts
that have taken notice when there are independent evaluations of costs and
benefits in the record before upholding environmental impact statements as
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419 See id. at 221–22. Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134, 138 (1944), considered an amicus
brief filed by the Department of Labor’s Administrator of the Wage and Hour Division, who had issued
an “Interpretative Bulletin” containing a standard for calculating working time. The Court held that
“[t]he weight of such a judgment in a particular case will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later pronouncements, and
all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to control.” Id. at 140. In Barnhart,
the Court considered the Social Security Administration’s interpretation of the Social Security Act, first
through a series of informal means, and then through notice-and-comment rulemaking. In holding that
Chevron applied, the Court explained that deference was due depending on “the interpretive method
used and the nature of the question at issue.” Barnhart, 535 U.S. at 222. As applied to the case at
hand, the inquiry could include a number of factors:
In this case, the interstitial nature of the legal question, the related expertise of the Agency, the
importance of the question to administration of the statute, the complexity of that administration, and
the careful consideration the Agency has given the question over a long period of time all indicate that
Chevron provides the appropriate legal lens through which to view the legality of the Agency interpretation here at issue.
Id. at 222. As such, Barnhart and Mead clarified that Chevron deference applies to interpretations with the force of law or promulgated pursuant to formal procedures such as formal adjudication or
notice-and-comment rulemaking, but that other expertise-based factors could warrant deference as well
— approaches that have been followed, in varying degrees, by the lower courts. See, e.g., Mylan Labs.,
Inc. v. Thompson, 389 F.3d 1272, 1279–80 (D.C. Cir. 2004); see also Lisa Schultz Bressman, How
Mead Has Muddled Judicial Review of Agency Action, 58 VAND. L. REV. 1443, 1457–74 (2005) (discussing in detail how lower courts have applied Mead and Barnhart).
420 See Vt. Yankee Nuclear Power Corp. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 435 U.S. 519, 524 (1978)
(holding that section 4 of the Administrative Procedures Act “established the maximum procedural requirements which Congress was willing to have the courts impose upon agencies in conducting rulemaking procedures”).
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reasonable under the National Environmental Policy Act.421 In a related
vein, courts have also critically viewed agency rejections of expert advisory committee opinions, especially when those opinions are required by
statute,422 and conversely regarded careful consideration of concerns raised
by such committees favorably.423 Similar approaches could further aid the
hard look inquiry.
C. Congress
To facilitate these doctrinal refinements, Congress could and should also play an important role in fostering independent evaluations of costbenefit analyses and improving such analyses’ quality as signals of regulatory impact. The Truth in Regulating Act of 2000,424 for example, temporarily required the General Accounting Office (GAO) to provide its own
external evaluations of agencies’ cost-benefit analyses for final rules.425
However, the provision depended on an additional $5.2 million in GAO’s
annual appropriations. The funds were never granted, but could still be in
the future.426 Alternatively, as Professor Susan Rose-Ackerman suggests,
an independent body (which she would call the Office for the Review of
Policy Analytic Techniques) could also be placed within the GAO, National Science Foundation, or the National Academy of Sciences.427 By creating and funding such bodies, Congress could play an important role in
helping to improve the quality of agency informational signals, thereby
helping to counter the structural incentives for strategic behavior and agency self-insulation.
Ultimately, refining this kind of information would improve the ability
of external actors to monitor agency behavior and would also reduce the
risk that such information might be simply dismissed as “cheap talk” and
discounted in value.428 Indeed, in situations where agents act strategically
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421 See, e.g., Nw. Envtl. Advocates v. Nat’l Marine Fisheries Serv., 460 F.3d 1125, 1143 (9th Cir.
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Review, 65 U. MIAMI L. REV. 335, 353–54 (2011).
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amidst information asymmetries, the private incentives for information aggregation and revelation are likely to depart from what is desirable from
the perspective of adequate monitoring by principals (again, whether the
President, Congress, or society more broadly).429 Independent evaluations
of the information produced could help to provide the necessary counterweight to such dynamics.
The prospective dynamics of agency self-insulation also highlight a
number of avenues through which Congress could more effectively insulate agencies from the President beyond the formal removal restrictions at
issue in Free Enterprise Fund, and in recognition of the more functional
nature of agency independence.430 For starters, recall that, ever since
Reagan’s executive order, presidential review has covered any “agency” as
defined by the Paperwork Reduction Act of 1980 (PRA)431 and expressly
excludes those defined as “independent regulatory agencies” under that
Act.432 Since 1981, then, Congress has had the ability to circumscribe the
coverage of presidential review through statutory amendments to the
PRA.433 Recent provisions contained in the Dodd-Frank Act — placing
the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau and the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency on the PRA’s list of “independent regulatory agencies”
— reflect this strategy.434
In addition, Congress could dictate specific policymaking forms that
are more likely, as a class, to bypass presidential review; for example, prohibiting rulemaking would channel policymaking to other forms such as
guidance documents.435 Congress could also use statutory deadlines to
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429 See Posner, supra note 20, at 1154–63 (analyzing incentives for agents to produce cost-benefit
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431 Pub. L. No. 96-511, 94 Stat. 2812 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 5, 20, 30, 42, and
44 U.S.C.).
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help empower executive agencies against the President, or provide for
overlapping agency jurisdictions or joint rulemakings that would create
and foster coalitions among agencies that, together, could provide greater
resistance to the President.436 Finally, because self-insulation is ultimately
a resource-centered strategy, Congress’s budgeting decisions for OIRA, the
Executive Office of the President, and various other executive agencies
would also help to determine the relative bargaining power within the executive branch.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued that the literature has given insufficient attention to the incentives created by presidential review relative to judicial review and has sought to help remedy that imbalance. The discussion has
provided a conceptual framework and vocabulary for thinking about strategic agency behavior in the context of presidential review, illustrated its
dynamics, and assessed its normative implications. The analysis yields
multiple hypotheses for future empirical work. Are there, for example, observable patterns of self-insulation that differ for certain groups of agencies, such as those with more costly or contentious rules? How do these
patterns shift under different political configurations, when different parties
are in power, or under periods of divided or unified government? Other
potentially fruitful research avenues include further attention to the President’s game-theoretic responses; the ways in which historical evolutions in
executive orders may reflect the self-insulation dynamic; and the similarities or differences between an agency’s expectations regarding presidential
review, on the one hand, and judicial review, on the other.
It is worth concluding by briefly reflecting upon a potential reason that
agency behavior under presidential review has not received sustained attention until now. One explanation may be the tendency of courts and
scholars to frame narrowly the question of insulation as one of agency institutional design.437 They identify a host of institutional “design features”
such as personnel hiring requirements and location outside the cabinet hierarchy as potential indicia of insulation from presidential influence.438 To
shield agencies is to structure them the right way.
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By contrast, this Article has argued that while agency institutional design choices can indeed help determine the degree of presidential control,
executive branch agencies too can engage in autonomous and selective
self-insulation from such influence even within these bounds. The question of insulation, that is, can be both exogenous and endogenous: a function of rules as well as the resulting realities. Agencies possess self-help
tools, in a sense, through which to insulate their decisions. Future accounts
of agency independence and insulation would be remiss to ignore them.

